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PANDEMICS, POPULISM AND THE ROLE OF LAW IN THE H1N1 
VACCINE CAMPAIGN 
WENDY E. PARMET* 
In the spring of 2009, a new strain of type A influenza (H1N1) arrived 
triggering the first influenza pandemic of the 21st century.1  With the initial 
discovery of the virus, scientists began working on developing a vaccine, the 
intervention widely believed to offer the greatest protection against an 
influenza pandemic.2  Shortly thereafter, federal health officials utilized a 
series of legal tools that had been put into place in the years prior to the 
pandemic to facilitate the rapid development and distribution of a vaccine.3  
By many measures, the use of these tools was a great success.  By the end 
of 2009, approximately 61 million Americans had been vaccinated against 
H1N1; by January 2010, over 124 million doses of vaccine had been 
distributed in the U.S.4  Although vaccination rates varied widely by state, in 
most states vaccination rates for children, a group at high risk for severe 
disease from H1N1, were higher than their prior rates for seasonal flu 
vaccination.5  Perhaps more importantly, the Vaccine Adverse Event 
 
* George J. and Kathleen Waters Matthews Distinguished Professor of Law, Northeastern 
University. 
 1. A dispute exists as to whether the H1N1 outbreak should be described as a 
pandemic.  In May 2009, WHO changed its definition of a pandemic so as to exclude any 
consideration of the severity of a disease.  See Deborah Cohen & Philip Carter, WHO and the 
Pandemic Flu “Conspiracies,” 340 BRIT. MED. J. 1274, 1275 (2010).  Despite this debate, the 
H1N1 outbreak will be termed a pandemic throughout this article. 
 2. See Press Release Ctr., CDC Briefing on Public Health Investigation of Human Cases 
of Swine Influenza, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION (CDC) (Apr. 23, 2009), 
http://cdc.gov/media/transcripts/2009/t090423.htm.  See also Ctrs. for Disease Control & 
Prevention, Interim Results: Influenza A (H1N1) 2009 Monovalent Vaccination Coverage – 
United States, October – December 2009, 59 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 44, 46-47 
(2010) (discussing that by the end of 2009, eighty-five million doses of H1N1 vaccine had 
been produced by U.S. drug manufacturers, and an estimated sixty-one million Americans had 
received the vaccine). 
 3. See infra text accompanying notes 54-77 and 195-96. 
 4. Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, Interim Results:  State-Specific Influenza A 
(H1N1) 2009 Monovalent Vaccination Coverage—United States, October 2009 - January 
2010, 59 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 363, 363 (2010). 
 5. Id. at 364. 
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Reporting System (VAERS) uncovered no “unusual events or pattern of 
adverse events,” different from that which is seen for seasonal flu vaccine.6 
By other measures, however, the campaign appeared less successful.  
Despite scientists’ best efforts, the vaccine took longer than anticipated to 
produce and was in woefully short supply during the height of the 
pandemic.7  As a result, many children and adults at high risk for severe 
disease were unable to obtain a vaccine when they most needed it, in the 
early fall of 2009.8  Yet, by late fall and early winter, as supplies became 
more plentiful, the public’s fears of the disease abated and were 
increasingly replaced by concerns about the vaccine’s safety.9  Critics also 
charged that the pandemic had been hyped by health officials to provide 
profits for vaccine makers.10  By the winter of 2010, over sixty million doses 
of vaccine were unused; many were destined to be destroyed.11 
What role did law play in both the successes and the shortfalls of the 
H1N1 vaccine campaign?  What lessons can be learned to guide future 
efforts to use law to protect the public from pandemic flu?  This article 
explores those questions, focusing on public health emergency laws’ impact 
on the H1N1 vaccine program and the interaction of those laws with the 
current populist stance in American political culture.12  Populism, a recurring 
riff in American history, is a political attitude most pointedly characterized by 
a profound distrust of elites.13  As such, it represents a significant challenge 
 
 6. Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, Summary of 2009 Monovalent H1N1 
Influenza Vaccine Data – Vaccine Adverse Event Reporting System, Data Through May 29, 
2010 (2010), available at http://vaers.hhs.gov/resources/2010H1N1Summary_June03.pdf 
(finding that as of May 29, 2010, sixty deaths were reported to the Vaccine Adverse Event 
Reporting System (VAERS) in conjunction with the H1N1 vaccine.  However, the CDC found 
no evidence to suggest these deaths were caused by the vaccine.). 
 7. Associated Press, Poll Indicates Swine Flu Vaccine Scarce, BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. 7, 
2009, at A2. 
 8. Stephanie Ebbert, Mom vs. Mom, Anxiety Fuels Competition to Score Swine Flu Shots 
for their Kids, BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. 21, 2009, at 26; Gillian K. SteelFisher et al., The Public’s 
Response to the 2009 H1N1 Influenza Pandemic, 362 NEW ENG. J. MED. e65(1), e65(1)-(2), 
e65(4)-(5) (2010). 
 9. Id. at e65(5). 
 10. See Barbara Loe Fisher, Politics, Profits & Pandemic Fear Mongering, NAT’L VACCINE 
INFO. CTR. BLOG (May 1, 2009), http://www.nvic.org/NVIC-Vaccine-News/May-2009/Friday, 
-May-01,-2009-Politics,-Profits---Pandemic-.aspx. 
 11. Stephen Smith, Swine Flu Vaccine is Widely Unused, BOSTON GLOBE, May 22, 2010, 
at B1; Mike Stobbe, Associated Press, Millions of Vaccine Doses to be Burned, ABC NEWS, 
July 1, 2010, available at http://abcnews.go.com/Health/wireStory?id=11061293. 
 12. For a discussion of contemporary populism, see Steve Fraser & Joshua B. Freeman, 
The Strange History of Tea Party Populism, SALON (May 3, 2010), http://www.salon.com/ 
news/feature/2010/05/03/tea_party_populism_history. 
 13. Political scientists and political historians have offered many definitions of populism.  
Michael Kazin, in his history of American populism, writes that the most “telling definition of 
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to public health officials and policymakers, who are almost always elites, or 
are at least widely perceived as such, in their attempt to respond to a 
pandemic.  In particular, populism poses a dilemma for public health 
professionals who seek to protect public health via vaccination because 
populism builds upon and exacerbates distrust of health officials’ assertions 
about the need for vaccination and its safety. At the same time, the public’s 
distrust of vaccines may spur officials to act even more forcefully than they 
otherwise would.  In either case, law may bridge or widen the divide 
between public health officials and the populations they are charged with 
protecting. 
Part One begins by providing a brief review of influenza pandemics and 
recent efforts to prepare for one.  The section then describes the 2009 
H1N1 vaccine campaign within the U.S.  Part Two examines why vaccines 
are critical to pandemic preparedness and considers the challenges 
policymakers face in securing both an adequate supply and a robust 
demand for pandemic vaccines.  Part Three reviews the legal responses that 
have been put in place over the last thirty years to address supply side 
problems.  Part Four turns to the demand side of the equation, reviewing the 
legal responses that public health officials have employed to address the 
public’s reluctance to be vaccinated.  Both Part Five and the Conclusion 
assess the relationship between the legal responses to supply and demand 
problems, and suggest that the laws that have been enacted to facilitate the 
development and distribution of pandemic vaccines may heighten the 
public’s distrust of public health officials.  If so, these laws may fail to 
achieve their goal of protecting the public from a pandemic. 
PART ONE: A PANDEMIC PREDICTED 
For more than five years, the specter of pandemic influenza has hovered 
over U.S. and world public health policy.14  In the past one hundred years, 
there have been three major influenza pandemics, none more lethal than 
the misnamed 1918 “Spanish flu” pandemic.15  That pandemic, which 
 
populism” is a “language whose speakers conceive of ordinary people as a noble assemblage 
not bounded narrowly by class, view their elite opponents as self-serving and undemocratic, 
and seek to mobilize the former against the latter.”  MICHAEL KAZIN, THE POPULIST PERSUASION: 
AN AMERICAN HISTORY 1 (Cornell University 1998) (1995). 
 14. See, e.g., Sandra Mounier-Jack & Richard J. Coker, How Prepared is Europe for 
Pandemic Influenza: Analysis of National Plans, 367 LANCET 1405, 1405-11 (2006) 
(analyzing European countries’ pandemic preparedness plans).  See also Jaro Kotalik, 
Preparing for an Influenza Pandemic: Ethical Issues, 19 BIOETHICS 422, 422-31 (2005) 
(analyzing pandemic preparedness plans of Canada, United Kingdom, and the United States 
from an ethical perspective). 
 15. See JOHN M. BARRY, THE GREAT INFLUENZA: THE EPIC STORY OF THE DEADLIEST PLAGUE IN 
HISTORY 4, 113-14, 117 (2004). 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
116 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY JOURNAL OF HEALTH LAW & POLICY [Vol. 4:113 
broke out in the waning days of World War I, is estimated to have killed 
between twenty and one hundred million people around the globe, making 
it the most deadly outbreak in recorded history.16  In 1957, the less lethal 
but still quite deadly Asian flu pandemic struck, killing approximately two 
million people worldwide.17  In 1967, the Hong Kong flu pandemic killed 
an estimated one million people.18 
In the years since 1967, scientists have repeatedly warned that another 
influenza pandemic, possibly as grave as the 1918 outbreak, was 
inevitable.19  That warning struck a chord with the Ford Administration in 
1976 when it ordered an unprecedented vaccination program after several 
soldiers at Fort Dix, New Jersey, contracted, and one died, from a swine flu 
virus that scientists thought resembled the 1918 strain.20  After 
approximately forty million Americans were vaccinated, the dreaded 
pandemic failed to materialize.21  The program was shelved as worries grew 
that the vaccine caused Guillian-Barré syndrome.22  In subsequent years, the 
1976 swine flu vaccine campaign served to illustrate the pitfalls public 
health officials face when they initiate prevention campaigns based on 
limited information.23  The campaign’s history also highlights the potential 
gulf between the perspective of public health officials, who stress the need to 
 
 16. Id. at 4.  See also GINA KOLOTA, FLU: THE STORY OF THE GREAT INFLUENZA PANDEMIC 
OF 1918 AND THE SEARCH FOR THE VIRUS IT CAUSED 7 (1999). 
 17. Global Alert and Response, Ten Concerns if Avian Influenza Becomes a Pandemic, 
WORLD HEALTH ORG. (Oct. 14, 2005), http://www.who.int/csr/disease/influenza/pandemic10 
things/en [hereinafter WHO].  See also BARRY, supra note 15, at 115. 
 18. WHO, supra note 17. 
 19.  Peter A. Patriarca & Nancy J. Cox, Influenza Pandemic Preparedness Plans for the 
United States, 176 J. INFECTIOUS DISEASES S4, S4 (1997). 
 20. RICHARD NEUSTADT & HARVEY FINEBERG, THE SWINE FLU AFFAIR: DECISION-MAKING ON A 
SLIPPERY DISEASE 5-6, 24-30 (University Press of the Pacific 2005) (1978).  See also KOLOTA, 
supra note 16, at 121-50 (recounting the 1976 death of a soldier at Fort Dix, the effort to 
identify the virus, and the Ford Administration’s response). 
 21. KOLOTA, supra note 16, at 167; J.S. Malik Peiris, Leo L.M. Poon & Yi Guan, 
Emergence of a Novel Swine-Origin Influenza A Virus (S-OIV) H1N1 Virus in Humans, 45 J. 
CLIN. VIROLOGY 169, 170 (2009). 
 22. Nina S. Appel, Liability in Mass Immunization Programs, 1980 BYU L. REV. 69, 72 
(1980); Peiris, Poon & Guan, supra note 21, at 170.  Whether the vaccine actually caused 
Guillain-Barré syndrome remains controversial.  See, e.g., Andrew Pollack, Fears of a Swine 
Flu Epidemic in 1976 Offer Some Lessons, and Concerns, Today, N.Y. TIMES, May 9, 2009, at 
A11 (quoting experts who question whether the 1976 vaccine caused Guillain-Barré 
syndrome); Lawrence B. Schonberger et al., Guillain-Barre Syndrome Following Vaccination in 
the National Influenza Immunization Program, United States, 1976-1977, 110 AMER. J. 
EPIDEMIOLOGY 105, 105-22 (1979) (finding an association between the vaccine and the 
syndrome). 
 23. NEUSTADT & FINEBERG, supra note 20, at 1-2. 
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“err on the side of overreaction,”24 and the views of the populations that 
officials seek to protect. 
In the 1990s, in response to a plethora of new infectious diseases, as 
well as broader social developments,25 scientists, health officials, and the 
media increasingly focused their attention on the dangers of so-called 
emerging diseases.26  As fear of contagion took hold,27 scientists were quick 
to warn that no disease has ever proven more lethal than the 1918 
influenza and that there was no reason to assume that such a horrific 
pandemic could not happen again.28  That prophecy seemed prescient in 
1997, when several young, previously healthy people died in Hong Kong 
from a new strain of avian influenza, known as H5N1.29  Fortunately, Hong 
Kong was able to quash the outbreak by slaughtering its chickens.30  But the 
virus did not vanish with the chickens; in the years that followed, H5N1 
spread around the globe. By 2005, the virus had infected birds in sixteen 
countries and over 120 people.31  Although the virus was not easily 
transmissible among humans (almost everyone who became ill had been in 
close contact with infected birds), it had a high (approximately fifty percent) 
 
 24. David J. Sencer & J. Donald Millar, Reflections on the 1976 Swine Flu Vaccination 
Program, 12 EMERGING INFECTIOUS DISEASES 29, 33 (2006), reprinted in THE DOMESTIC AND 
INTERNATIONAL IMPACTS OF THE 2009-H1N1 INFLUENZA A PANDEMIC 297, 305 (David Relman et 
al., 2009). 
 25. Wendy Parmet, Public Health and Social Control 14-19 (Int’l Council on Human 
Rights Pol’y, Working Paper, 2009), available at http://www.ichrp.org/files/papers/173/ 
public_health_and_social_control_wendy_parmet.pdf.  The claims that scientists and public 
health officials focused attention on emerging diseases is not meant to imply that they acted in 
bad faith; rather that they responded to social as well as biological developments. 
 26. See id. for a more complete discussion of the renewed concern that scientists, 
officials, and the media gave to infectious disease in the 1990s. 
 27. See PRISCILLA WALD, CONTAGIOUS: CULTURES, CARRIERS, AND THE OUTBREAK NARRATIVE 
1-28 (Duke University Press, 2008) (discussing fear of contagious disease in the 1990s). 
 28. E.g., W. Paul Glezen, Emerging Infections: Pandemic Influenza, 18 EPIDEMIOLOGIC 
REVS. 64, 64-65 (1996); Robin Marantz Henig, The Flu Pandemic, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 29, 
1992, at 28; Kennedy F. Shortridge, The Next Pandemic Influenza Virus?, 346 LANCET 1210, 
1210-11 (1995). 
 29. See PETE DAVIES, THE DEVIL’S FLU: THE WORLD’S DEADLIEST INFLUENZA EPIDEMIC AND THE 
SCIENTIFIC HUNT FOR THE VIRUS THAT CAUSED IT 1-64 (2000).  In the wake of the outbreak in 
Hong Kong, several authors wrote books designed to acquaint a popular audience with the 
1918 epidemic and warn about the possibility of a new pandemic.  See, e.g., BARRY, supra 
note 15; KOLOTA, supra note 16. 
 30. Nina Y. Kung et al., Risk for Infection with Highly Pathogenic Influenza A Virus (H5N1) 
in Chickens, Hong Kong, 2002, 13 EMERGING INFECTIOUS DISEASES, 412, 412 (2007). 
 31. HOMELAND SECURITY COUNCIL, NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR PANDEMIC INFLUENZA 1, 1 
(2005) [hereinafter NATIONAL STRATEGY]. 
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case mortality rate.32  Chastened by the world’s experience in 2003 with 
severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS), health officials around the globe 
intensified their cry for pandemic preparedness.33 
The Bush Administration responded in 2005 by releasing the National 
Strategy for Pandemic Influenza34 (Strategy), which was designed to guide 
federal efforts to plan and prepare for a potential influenza pandemic.35  
Vaccination played a prominent role in the Strategy: 
In combination with traditional public health measures, vaccines and 
antiviral drugs form the foundation of our infection control strategy.  
Vaccination is the most important element of this strategy, but we 
acknowledge that a two-pronged strategy incorporating both vaccines and 
antivirals is essential.36 
More specifically, the Strategy called for enhancing domestic production of 
influenza vaccination so that the entire population could be vaccinated 
within six months of the start of a pandemic, stockpiling sufficient pre-
pandemic avian influenza vaccine to immediately vaccinate “front-line 
personnel and at risk populations including military personnel,” developing 
distribution plans, and eradicating “regulatory and other legal barriers to 
the expansion of our domestic vaccine production capacity.”37 
The federal government’s approach for meeting those goals was spelled 
out more explicitly in the Homeland Security Council’s 2006 Implementation 
Plan.38  Underlying the Implementation Plan was the assumption that 
pandemic influenza would initially develop overseas.  The plan aimed to 
improve surveillance and detection of influenza around the world so that the 
federal government could try to contain, or at least slow down, the spread 
of a pandemic within the United States until such time as a vaccine would 
be widely available.39  Targeted deployment of pre-pandemic vaccine and 
 
 32. Id.; DAVIES, supra note 29, at 26-27; Arunee Thitithanyanont et al., High Susceptibiity 
of Human Dendritic Cells to Avian Influenza H5N1 Virus Infection and Protection by IFN–α and 
TLR Ligands, 179 J. IMMUNOLOGY 5220, 5220 (2007). 
 33. See Richard J. Webby & Robert G. Webster, Are We Ready for Pandemic Influenza?, 
320 SCIENCE 1519, 1519 (2003) (reviewing pandemic preparedness plans after threats of 
severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS), bioterrorism, West Nile virus, and other threats). 
 34. See NATIONAL STRATEGY, supra note 31. 
 35. Around the same time, the CDC published proposed revised quarantine regulations, 
but the regulations were never promulgated.  Control of Communicable Diseases, 70 Fed. 
Reg. 71892 (Nov. 20, 2005).  Additionally, the Public Readiness and Emergency 
Preparedness Act (PREPA), Pub. L. 109-148, was enacted in 2005.  For a more complete 
discussion of PREPA, see infra text accompanying notes 179-99. 
 36. NATIONAL STRATEGY, supra note 31, at 5. 
 37. Id. 
 38. See HOMELAND SECURITY COUNCIL, NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR PANDEMIC INFLUENZA: 
IMPLEMENTATION PLAN 104-07 (2006) [hereinafter IMPLEMENTATION PLAN]. 
 39. Id. at 1. 
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antiviral medications, potentially in conjunction with non-pharmaceutical 
interventions (such as quarantines or border closings), were critical to the 
plan.40 
Although a pandemic was widely predicted, the one that arrived in the 
spring of 2009 did not conform to health officials’ prognostications.41  
Pandemic planning reports had repeatedly cited the 1918 outbreak, 
warning that “a modern pandemic could lead to the deaths of 200,000 to 2 
million people in the United States alone.”42  Fortunately, H1N1 proved to 
be far less deadly.  As of March 2010, the Centers for Disease Control and 
Prevention (CDC) reported that about 12,000 people died from H1N1,43 
meaning that fewer Americans died from the H1N1 pandemic than die from 
so-called seasonal flu in a typical year.44  That comparison, however, may 
understate H1N1’s impact.  In contrast to seasonal flu, but as in 1918, 
serious illness and death were disproportionately experienced by persons 
under age forty-five.45  Young children and pregnant women faced 
especially high risks.46  In the first wave of the pandemic, between April and 
August 2009, five percent of all deaths from H1N1 were among pregnant 
women, even though pregnant women represent only one percent of the 
 
 40. Id. at 105-08. 
 41. See Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, The 2009 H1N1 Pandemic: Summary 
Highlights, April 2009-April 2010 (June 16, 2010), http://cdc.gov/h1n1flu/cdcresponse.htm, 
for a discussion of evolution of the 2009 pandemic [hereinafter Summary Highlights]. 
 42. See IMPLEMENTATION PLAN, supra note 38, at 1. 
 43. Press Release,CDC 2009 H1N1 Flu Media Briefing, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & 
PREVENTION (Mar. 29, 2010), http://cdc.gov/media/transcripts/2010/t100329.htm. 
 44. There is debate over the death toll of seasonal flu because most deaths attributed to 
influenza are not confirmed by laboratory analysis, and influenza resembles and may 
complicate many other illnesses.  Estimates vary from approximately 21,000 deaths per year 
in the U.S. to over 40,000 deaths per year.  For a review of the literature and a discussion of 
one regression model that purports to show an annual average death toll of 41,000, see 
Jonathan Dushoff et al., Mortality Due to Influenza in the United States – An Annualized 
Regression Approach Using Multiple-Cause Mortality Data, 163 AM. J. EPIDEMIOLOGY 181, 
181-87 (2005).  Recently, the CDC has lowered its estimate of annual deaths from seasonal 
flu from 36,000 to 24,000.  See Estimate Lowered of Typical Flu Toll, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 27, 
2010, at A14. 
 45. Kristen A. Swedish, Gina Conenello & Stephanie H. Factor, First Season of 2009 
H1N1 Influenza, 77 MOUNT SINAI J. MED. 103, 105, 108 (2010). 
 46. Id.  These groups are also at high risk for seasonal flu.  What distinguished H1N1 is 
that individuals over sixty-five did not face high risks.  Other high risk groups for H1N1 
included people with chronic diseases or obesity.  See id. at 108. 
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U.S. population.47  Disproportionate rates of morbidity and mortality were 
also reported among American Indian and Alaskan Natives.48 
H1N1 also defied predictions by originating in North America.49  
Contrary to expectations,50 by the time the virus was detected, it had already 
spread widely in the United States and Mexico.51 Containment by targeted 
distribution of antiviral medications, border closings, or quarantine was 
impossible.52  As a result, health officials were forced to rely on widely 
promulgated appeals for hand-washing and respiratory etiquette to slow the 
virus’ spread.53 
Federal officials also quickly launched the nation’s second swine flu 
vaccine campaign, even as they noted that vaccine would not be available 
for many months.54  As early as April 26, 2009, just days after the CDC 
announced that the first cases of H1N1 had been identified, the Department 
of Health and Human Services (DHHS) declared a public health emergency, 
setting the stage for the issuance of “Emergency Use Authorizations” (EUAs) 
 
 47. Alicia M. Siston et al., Pandemic 2009 Influenza A (H1N1) Virus Illness Among 
Pregnant Women in the United States, 303 JAMA 1517, 1522-23 (2010). 
 48. Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, Deaths Related to 2009 Pandemic Influenza A 
(H1N1) Among American Indian/Alaska Natives - 12 States, 2009, 58 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY 
WKLY. REP. 1341, 1341 (2009). 
 49. Novel H1N1 Flu: Background on the Situation, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & 
PREVENTION (July 31, 2009), http://www.cdc.gov/h1n1flu/background.htm. 
 50. As historians and sociologists have noted, it is common to assume that fearsome 
diseases derive from “abroad.”  See Parmet, Public Health and Social Control, supra note 25, 
at 13-14. 
 51. SARAH A. LISTER & C. STEPHEN REDHEAD, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R 40554, THE 2009 
INFLUENZA A (H1N1) “SWINE FLU” OUTBREAK: AN OVERVIEW 1, 1 (2009); Novel H1N1 Flu: 
Background on the Situation, supra note 49. 
 52. LISTER & REDHEAD, supra note 51, at 2. 
 53. See Questions and Answers: 2009 H1N1 (“Swine Flu”) and You, CTRS. FOR DISEASE 
CONTROL & PREVENTION (Feb. 10, 2010), http://www.cdc.gov/h1n1flu/qa.htm (CDC’s 
recommendations to prevent H1N1 spreading by hand washing and covering coughs).  In the 
early days of the pandemic, some communities closed their schools.  LISTER & REDHEAD, supra 
note 51.  The CDC stated that “[s]chool dismissal and childcare closures are an important 
part of a comprehensive, layered mitigation approach” to H1N1.  CDC Health Update: 
School (K – 12) Dismissal and Childcare Facilities: Interim CDC Guidance in Response to 
Human Infections with The Influenza A H1N1 Virus, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION 
(May 1, 2009), http://www.cdc.gov/h1n1flu/HAN?050109.htm.  A few days later, CDC 
revised its guidance to recommend that schools only be closed if too many students and 
teachers were ill to enable the schools to function.  Media Statement, Change in CDC’s 
School and Childcare Guidance, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION (May 5, 2009), 
http://www.cdc.gov/media/pressre/2009/S090505.htm. 
 54. Andrew Pollack, Swine Flu Vaccine May Be Months Away, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 29, 2009, 
at A10. 
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permitting the unlicensed use of laboratory tests and antiviral medications.55  
In May 2009, the federal government set aside $1 billion for vaccine 
development.56  By June, as the virus spread around the world, The Wall 
Street Journal reported that drug companies were “ramping up [vaccine] 
production.”57  Around the same time, DHHS Secretary Kathleen Sebelius 
issued the first of many so-called “PREPA” declarations, finding H1N1 to be 
a public health emergency and authorizing immunity for those making or 
administering H1N1 vaccines.58 
In July 2009, citing the risk that the H1N1 pandemic could reappear in 
the fall, the federal government decided to push ahead with the H1N1 
vaccine campaign.59  The CDC issued guidance to state and local public 
health departments about the coming fall vaccination campaign and held a 
“summit” to discuss plans and priorities.60  That same month, an advisory 
committee for the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) recommended that 
the FDA license the vaccine without waiting for the results of clinical trials.61  
On July 13, the federal government signed a $1 billion contract with four 
companies to purchase components for the vaccine.62 
Throughout the summer of 2009, work continued on manufacturing the 
vaccine and planning for its eventual distribution.63  But on October 16, 
scientists reported that the vaccine was taking longer than anticipated to 
 
 55. Charles E. Johnson, Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., Determination that a Public 
Health Emergency Exists, FLU.GOV (Apr. 26, 2009), http://www.flu.gov/professional/federal/ 
h1n1emergency042609.html.  The emergency was eventually allowed to expire on June 23, 
2010.  Press Release, Influenza Public Health Emergency Determination Expired on June 23: 
HHS Encourages Americans to Continue to Practice Flu Prevention Techniques, FLU.GOV, 
http://www.flu.gov/news/h1n1pheexpiration.html (last visited Sept. 26, 2010); Summary 
Highlights, supra note 41 (issuing an Emergency Use Authorization allows usage of antiviral 
drugs in a manner different than what was approved by the FDA). 
 56. Betsy McKay, For Flu Vaccine, U.S. Sets Aside $1 Billion, WALL ST. J., May 23-24, 
2009, at A4. 
 57. Jeanne Whelan, Flu Pandemic Spurs Queries About Vaccine, WALL ST. J., June 15, 
2009, at A11. 
 58. Pandemic Influenza Antivirals – Amendment, 74 Fed. Reg. 29213 (June 19, 2009) 
(amendment pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 247d-6d, 319F-3(b)). 
 59. Betsy McKay, Plans for Vaccination Campaign Begin, WALL ST. J., July 10, 2009, at 
A4. 
 60. Summary Highlights, supra note 41. 
 61. Jennifer Corbett Dooren & Nicholas Winning, Swine Flu Prevention Takes on New 
Urgency, WALL ST. J., July 24, 2009, at A3. 
 62. Jennifer Corbett Dooren, Health & Wellness: U.S. to Buy H1N1 Vaccine Components 
from Four Firms, WALL ST. J., July 14, 2009, at D4. 
 63. See Rob Stein, Swine Flu Could Infect Half of U.S.: Presidential Panel’s Estimate is First 
to Gauge Possible Impact of Epidemic, WASH. POST, Aug. 25, 2009, at A1. 
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produce.64  As the public waited for the vaccine, fear of the pandemic 
began to diminish and distrust of the vaccine started to take hold.65  Shortly 
after the FDA licensed four vaccines to be used against the virus,66 a poll 
taken by the Harvard School of Public Health found that only forty percent of 
adults were sure they would be vaccinated.67  The Washington Post quoted 
Gregory Poland, an expert on influenza vaccine at the Mayo Clinic, as 
stating: “There’s a lot of misinformation out there. . . .Then you mix into that 
people’s concerns about conspiracy theories and government misbehavior 
and conflicts of interest and all of that, and the average layperson has a 
difficult time discerning what to do.”68 
In many ways, the vaccine campaign that was unfurled in the fall of 
2009 was marked by a series of contrasting fears: fears about not being 
able to get the vaccine, fears about being vaccinated, and fears of being 
forced to be vaccinated.  In the summer of 2009, New York’s Board of 
Health, fearing that health workers would reject vaccination, issued an 
emergency regulation requiring hospital workers with patient contact to be 
vaccinated for both seasonal and H1N1 influenza.69  Health care workers 
responded by filing at least four lawsuits challenging the regulation.70  
Shortly after a state trial judge issued a temporary restraining order barring 
enforcement of the regulation, the state rescinded it, noting the shortage of 
pandemic vaccine.71  This litigation was echoed in cases throughout the 
country brought by employees, or their unions, protesting hospital policies 
mandating vaccination.72  Yet, while many health care workers fought 
mandatory vaccination, most people who wanted to be vaccinated could 
not be. By early November 2009, the Associated Press reported that only 
 
 64. Press Release, Weekly 2009 H1N1 Flu Media Briefing, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & 
PREVENTION (Oct. 16, 2009), http://www.cdc.gov/media/transcripts/2009/t091016.htm. 
 65. SteelFisher et al., supra note 8, at e65(5). 
 66. Press Release, FDA Approves Vaccines for 2009 H1N1 Influenza Virus: Approval 
Provides Important Tool to Fight Pandemic, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. (Sept. 15, 2009), 
http://www.fda.gov/newsevents/newsroom/pressannouncements/ucm182399.htm. 
 67. Press Release, Survey Finds Just 40% of Adults “Absolutely Certain” They Will Get 
H1N1 Vaccine, HARVARD SCH. PUB. HEALTH (Oct. 2, 2009), http://www.hsph.harvard.edu/ 
news/press-releases/2009-releases/survey-40-adults-absolutely-certain-h1n1-vaccine.html. 
 68. Robert Stein, Vaccine Is On Its Way, But Public Still Wary, Swine Flu Campaign Faces 
Key Barriers: Unease, Ambivalence, WASH. POST, October 4, 2009, at A18. 
 69. 10 N.Y. ADC 66-3.2. 
 70. Wendy E. Parmet, Pandemic Vaccines—The Legal Landscape, 362 NEW ENG. J. MED. 
1949, 1951 (2010). 
 71. New York Court Stops State From Requiring Flu Vaccinations for Health Care Workers, 
18 HEALTH L. REP. (BNA) 1414 (Oct. 22, 2009).  See also Order to Show Cause at 2-3, 
Brynien v. Daines, No. 8853-09 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Oct. 15, 2009); Order to Show Cause at 1, 
Patterson v. Daines, No. 8830-09 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Oct. 16, 2009), 2009 WL 3444742. 
 72. Parmet, Pandemic Vaccines—The Legal Landscape, supra note 70, at 1951-52. 
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one third of adults who tried to be vaccinated, including those who were 
considered at high risk for significant complications, could find vaccine.73  
Parents were reported to be anxious and frustrated, as were doctors and 
health officials, who had to deal with short and seemingly random 
supplies.74  Then in December 2009, as supplies picked up, the CDC 
announced two voluntary “non-safety” recalls of H1N1 vaccine.75  
Meanwhile, worries about the pandemic abated, as the dreaded second 
wave appeared no more virulent than the first.  By March 2010, newspapers 
reported that the flu season had “fizzled;” cases of flu had dwindled to fewer 
than those in a typical year.76  With 155 million doses of H1N1 vaccine 
distributed in the U.S., only 86 million individuals had been vaccinated, a 
number lower than the typical number of people who are vaccinated 
annually for seasonal flu.77 
Fortunately complications from the vaccine appeared to be relatively 
infrequent and usually mild.  As of April 30, 2010, the VAERS had received 
reports of 11,029 adverse events following the administration of the H1N1 
vaccine, the vast majority of which were deemed non-serious.78  Only 7.5% 
of reported adverse events were serious; a percentage similar to that 
expected for seasonal flu vaccine.79  Fifty-six deaths were reported and were 
being investigated, but preliminary findings did not “suggest” any 
association with the vaccine.80 
Was the campaign necessary?  Was it a resounding success or a 
dispiriting failure?  Scientists will undoubtedly debate those questions in the 
years to come.  The sections below focus on a different, but no less 
important set of questions: what role did law play in promoting the 
 
 73. Associated Press, Poll Indicates Swine Flu Vaccine Scarce, supra note 7. 
 74. Stephen Smith, A Day in the Life of a Pandemic, BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. 8, 2009, at 
A11. 
 75. Non-Safety-Related Voluntary Recall of Certain Lots of Sanofi Pasteur H1N1 Pediatric 
(0.25 mL, for 6-35 month olds) Vaccine in Pre-Filled Syringes: Questions & Answers, CTRS. FOR 
DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION (Dec. 15, 2009), http://www.cdc.gov/h1n1flu/vaccination/ 
syringes_qa.htm; Voluntary Non-Safety-Related Recall of Specific Lots of Nasal Spray Vaccine 
for 2009 H1N1 Influenza, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION (Dec. 22, 2009), 
http://www.cdc.gov/h1n1flu/vaccination/sprayrecall_qa.htm. 
 76. Betsy McKay, The Flu Season That Fizzled: Cases of H1N1 Have Dwindled, Seasonal 
Flu has Been a No-Show and Doctors Wonder Why, WALL ST. J., March 2, 2010, at D1. 
 77. Id. at D2. 
 78. CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, SUMMARY OF 2009 MONOVALENT H1N1 
INFLUENZA VACCINE DATA—VACCINE ADVERSE EVENT REPORTING SYSTEM DATA THROUGH APRIL 30, 
2010, at 1 (2010), available at http://vaers.hhs.gov/resources/2010H1N1Summary_May 
07.pdf 
 79. Id. 
 80. Id. at 1-2. 
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successes and fostering the limitations of the 2009 H1N1 vaccine 
campaign? 
PART TWO: INFLUENZA VACCINES – THE PROMISES AND CHALLENGES 
The central role accorded to vaccines in U.S. pandemic preparedness 
plans is not surprising.  Vaccines are widely recognized as among the most 
effective public health interventions.81  In the event of a deadly influenza 
pandemic, vaccines are especially important because of the lack of 
adequate alternatives.  Although antiviral medications may lessen 
influenza’s impact, and when used in conjunction with isolation, reduce the 
number of cases of influenza in a pandemic,82 many strains of influenza are 
resistant to one or more antiviral medicines.83  The widespread prophylactic 
use of antivirals may also lead to the transmission of resistant strains 
reducing the drugs’ efficacy for clinical cases.84  Likewise, non-
pharmaceutical interventions, such as quarantines, border closings, curfews, 
and school closings are of limited (and contested) utility against influenza.85  
They also impose enormous social costs.86  Vaccines, in contrast, can 
reduce flu’s transmission without exacting widespread social disruption.87 
 
 81. See DEP’T OF IMMUNIZATION, VACCINES & BIOLOGICALS, WORLD HEALTH ORG. & 
UNICEF, GIVS: GLOBAL IMMUNIZATION VISION AND STRATEGY: 2006-2015 3 (2005), available 
at http://www.who.int/vaccines-documents/DocsPDF05/GIVS_Final_EN.pdf. 
 82. Some researchers suggest that the rapid use of antiviral medications could help 
contain or at least slow the spread of a novel influenza virus.  E.g., Marc Lipsitch et al., 
Antiviral Resistance and the Control of Pandemic Influenza, 4 PUB. LIBR. SCI. MED., 111, 112 
(2007); Ira M. Longini, Jr., Containing Influenza With Antiviral Agents, 169 AM. J. 
EPIDEMOLOGY 623, 630 (2004). 
 83. Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, Prevention and Control of Influenza: 
Recommendations of the Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices (ACIP), 2008, 57 
MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 1, 39-40 (2008); U.S. Food & Drug Admin., Influenza (Flu) 
Antiviral Drugs and Related Information, http://www.fda.gov/drugs/drugsafety/informationby 
drugclass/ucm100228.htm#AntiviralMedications (last visited Sept. 15, 2010). 
 84. See Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, Oseltamivir-Resistant 2009 Pandemic 
Influenza A(H1N1) Virus Infection in Two Summer Campers Receiving Prophylaxis-North 
Carolina, 2009, 58 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 969, 969 (2009). 
 85. See Julia E. Aledort et al., Non-Pharmaceutical Public Health Interventions for 
Pandemic Influenza: An Evaluation of the Evidence Base, 7 BMC PUB. HEALTH 208, 213-14 
(2007). 
 86. See Sencer & Millar, supra note 24, at 68-69. 
 87. Indeed, vaccines can provide what is known as herd immunity.  If a sufficiently large 
percentage of a population is vaccinated, the transmission of a disease may be disrupted.  As 
a result, even individuals who are not vaccinated may be protected.  N.T. Begg & N.J. Gay, 
Theory of Infectious Disease Transmission and Herd Immunity, in 3 TOPLEY AND WILSON’S 
MICROBIOLOGY AND MICROBIAL INFECTIONS: BACTERIAL INFECTIONS 148, 151 (William J. 
Hausler, Jr. & Max Sussman eds., 9th ed. 1997). 
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Although vaccines theoretically offer our best defense to pandemic 
influenza, developing and administering pandemic vaccines is not easy.  
Both technical and social (including legal and economic) challenges 
complicate efforts to rely upon vaccines in the face of a pandemic. 
The technical problems relate both to the nature of the influenza virus 
and the way vaccines used to prevent it are developed.  The influenza virus 
changes rapidly and thus far, new strains require new vaccines.88  In the 
case of seasonal flu, vaccine is prepared based upon health officials’ 
prediction of the strains that will be prevalent during the next flu season.89  
That prediction is generally made in February, leaving a limited amount of 
time to produce vaccine for the next season.90  Production of pandemic 
vaccine is even more challenging because a pandemic strain is inevitably a 
new strain, and as H1N1 illustrated, cannot be easily predicted.91  As a 
result, an effective pandemic vaccine cannot be developed until the 
pandemic virus has been detected.92  By that time, however, as was true 
with H1N1, the virus may already be widely dispersed around the world. 
Complicating the problem is the fact that influenza vaccine is grown in 
eggs, a time-consuming and delicate process.93  For years, scientists have 
eagerly anticipated the development of cell-based technologies that could 
eliminate the need for eggs.94  This would be especially important in the 
event of an avian influenza pandemic since that virus kills eggs.95  Although 
progress has been made in developing this technology, it was not available 
 
 88. For a more detailed discussion, see Lauren M. Smith & Gigi Kwik Gronvall, Influenza 
Vaccine Production for the U.S. Market, 7 BIOSECURITY & BIOTERRORISM: BIODEFENSE STRATEGY, 
PRAC. & SCI. 259, 259-60 (2009).  Scientists hope to develop a vaccine that will work for all 
strains of influenza.  See id. at 261-62.  Until that happens, new vaccines will need to be 
developed continuously to track the virus’ evolution. 
 89. Id. at 260. 
 90. TIM BROOKES, A WARNING SHOT: INFLUENZA AND THE 2004 FLU VACCINE SHORTAGE 15-
16 (2005). 
 91. Pandemic Influenza Vaccine Manufacturing Process and Timeline, WORLD HEALTH 
ORG. (August 6, 2009), http://www.who.int/csr/disease/swineflu/notes/h1n1_vaccine_2009 
0806/en/index.html. 
 92. Id. 
 93. Smith & Gronvall, supra note 88, at 260-61.  For a further discussion of the process 
of developing vaccine in eggs, see BROOKES, supra note 90, at 15-22. 
 94. Smith & Gronvall, supra note 88, at 261.  See BROOKES, supra note 90, at 18. 
 95. See Richard Harris, Pandemic Flu Spurs Race for New Vaccine Methods, NPR.ORG 
(Dec. 6, 2005), http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=5039634. 
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in time for the H1N1 pandemic.96  Indeed, in 2009, problems growing the 
vaccine in eggs were blamed for delays in the vaccine’s production.97 
The social barriers to the rapid development, distribution, and 
administration of a pandemic vaccine may be even more formidable than 
the technical challenges.  For a variety of reasons, including extensive 
regulatory requirements, the labor-intensive nature of vaccine production, 
and the fact that vaccines are not given to individuals daily (as are many of 
the most profitable medications), vaccines are costly to develop and provide 
relatively low profits to their manufacturers.98  As discussed below, 
manufacturers also claim that the risk of legal liability undermines vaccines’ 
profitability.99 Regardless of whether these risks are as great as 
manufacturers contend, there is little doubt that in the late twentieth century 
manufacturing capacity in the U.S. declined precipitously.  In 1967, twenty-
six companies produced vaccines in the U.S.; by 2005, only five companies 
did so.100  In 2008, there was only one domestic manufacturer of influenza 
vaccine.101  The dangers of this meager supply became evident in 2004, 
when one of two manufacturers licensed to produce influenza vaccine for 
the U.S. market had to limit production due to contamination in a plant in 
Great Britain.102  The result was a significant shortage of flu vaccine during 
the fall flu season.103  As will be discussed below, many of the legal changes 
initiated as part of pandemic planning focused on solving these “supply 
side” problems. 
Public health policymakers, however, have also had to consider the 
demand side of the equation—the willingness of individuals to be 
 
 96. See Scott Gottlieb, Am. Enter. Inst. Pub. Pol’y Res., Responding to the H1N1 
Pandemic with Vaccines: Vulnerabilities and Lessons Learned, HEALTH POL’Y OUTLOOK, no. 15, 
2009, at 1, 4-5. 
 97. Id.; Stephen Smith, Swine Flu Shots Delayed for Most, BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. 1, 2009, 
at A15. 
 98. COMM. ON THE EVALUATION OF VACCINE PURCHASE FINANCING IN THE U.S., INST. OF 
MED., FINANCING VACCINES IN THE 21ST CENTURY: ASSURING ACCESS AND AVAILABILITY 111-16 
(2004) [hereinafter FINANCING VACCINES]. 
 99. For a more detailed discussion of the perceived economic disincentives to vaccine 
production, see BROOKES, supra note 90, at 34-35; Michelle M. Mello & Troyen A. Brennan, 
Legal Concerns and the Influenza Vaccine Shortage, 294 JAMA 1817, 1819-20 (2005). 
 100. Mello & Brennan, supra note 99, at 1820. 
 101. U.S. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, U.S. POLICY REGARDING PANDEMIC INFLUENZA VACCINES 4 
(2008), available at http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/95xx/doc9573/09-15-PandemicFlu.pdf 
[hereinafter U.S. POLICY]. 
 102. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, INFLUENZA VACCINE: SHORTAGES IN 2004-2005 
SEASON UNDERSCORE NEED FOR BETTER PREPARATION, GAO-05-984, at 1 (2005) [hereinafter 
GAO].  See Cormac Sheridan, Next Generation Flu Vaccine Boosted by Chiron Debacle, 22 
NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY 1487, 1487 (2004). 
 103. GAO, supra note 102; BROOKES, supra note 90, at 43-46. 
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vaccinated. Despite their proven efficacy – indeed, perhaps in part because 
of their effectiveness104 – vaccines have always been the subject of heated 
controversy.105  Ever since Edward Jenner demonstrated the efficacy of the 
smallpox vaccine in 1798, vaccination has ignited virulent opposition.106  
Many so-called anti-vaccinationists have religious objections to vaccination; 
others simply believe that vaccines are unnatural and/or dangerous, 
especially to children.107  This distrust of vaccines and, indirectly, the health 
officials who recommend them, is widely evident on the many Internet 
websites that stress both the hazards of vaccines (including their alleged link 
to autism) and the supposedly impure financial incentives of vaccine 
manufacturers.108  Although overall vaccination rates for American children 
remain high,109 researchers have noted the growth in ardency, if not in 
numbers, of this anti-vaccinationist movement.110  Not surprisingly, the 
public’s unease, or just disinterest, in vaccines affects the supply.  With the 
 
 104. This is especially the case with childhood vaccines.  As vaccines have helped make 
once-feared childhood diseases less common, many parents have come to believe that 
vaccines pose a greater risk to their child than the diseases the vaccines prevent.  See Steve P. 
Calandrillo, Vanishing Vaccinations: Why Are So Many Americans Opting Out of Vaccinating 
Their Children?, 37 UNIV. MICH.  J.L. REFORM 353, 404 (2004). 
 105. ARTHUR ALLEN, VACCINE: THE CONTROVERSIAL STORY OF MEDICINE’S GREATEST LIFESAVER 
passim (2007). 
 106. Id. at 56-111.  Indeed, vaccination’s predecessor, the practice of inoculating 
individuals with the pus of people who were sick with smallpox to prevent a severe case of the 
disease, was also highly controversial.  See id. at 28-45. 
 107. See Calandrillo, supra note 104, at 414, 416. 
 108. Andrea Rock, The Lethal Dangers of the Billion-Dollar Vaccine Business, MONEY, Dec. 
1, 1996, at 148. For an analysis of these sites, see P. Davies, S. Chapman & J. Leask, 
Antivaccination Activists on the World Wide Web, 87 ARCHIVES OF DISEASE IN CHILDHOOD 22, 
22-24 (2002); Anna Kata, A Postmodern Pandora’s Box: Anti-Vaccination Misinformation on 
the Internet, 28 VACCINE 1709, 1709-15 (2010); Robert M. Wolfe, Lisa K. Sharp & Martin S. 
Lipsky, Content and Design Attributes of Antivaccination Web Sites, 287 JAMA 3245, 3245-47 
(2010).  For an overview of the movement alleging that vaccines cause autism, see SETH 
MNOOKIN, PANIC VIRUS: A TRUE STORY OF MEDICINE, SCIENCE AND FEAR 99-273 (2011).  The 
claim that vaccines, or more specifically thimerosal, a preservative that was once widely used 
in childhood vaccines, causes autism is laid out in DAVID KIRBY, EVIDENCE OF HARM: MERCURY 
IN VACCINES AND THE AUTISM EPIDEMIC: A MEDICAL CONTROVERSY passim  (2006).  Most 
scientists reject this claim, as have courts in vaccine cases.  See, e.g., Cedillo v. Sec’y Dep’t 
Health & Human Servs., 617 F.3d 1328, 1334 (Fed. Cir. 2010); Hazlehurst v. Sec’y Dep’t 
Health & Human Servs, 604 F.3d 1343, 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2010); Christofer S. Price et al., 
Prenatal and Infant Exposure to Thimerosal From Vaccines and Immunoglobulins and Risk of 
Autism, 126 PEDIATRICS 656, 660-63 (2010). 
 109. CDC Survey Finds Childhood Immunization Rates Remain High, CTRS. FOR DISEASE 
CONTROL & PREVENTION, http://www.cdc.gov/media/pressrel/2010/r100916.htm (Sept. 16, 
2010) (reporting that the “coverage for most of the routine vaccines remain[s] at or over 90 
percent”). 
 110. ALLEN, supra note 105, at 327-70. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
128 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY JOURNAL OF HEALTH LAW & POLICY [Vol. 4:113 
demand for vaccine uncertain, manufacturers are even more reluctant than 
they might otherwise be to invest in increased production capacity.111  In 
other words, lack of demand reduces supply. 
It is not surprising that this skepticism or distrust of vaccines was 
prevalent during the H1N1 epidemic which struck during a period in which 
Americans questioned not only the competency but also the intentions of 
many institutions, including large corporations and the federal 
government.112  According to a review of several polls taken during the fall 
H1N1 pandemic, only about half of all Americans stated that they expected 
to be vaccinated.113  Concern about the safety of the vaccine was the most 
common reason cited by those who expected to decline vaccination for 
either themselves or their children.114  Critics went further and questioned 
whether public health organizations, including CDC and the World Health 
Organization (WHO), pushed vaccination in order to secure revenue for 
vaccine makers.115  In response, WHO announced an investigation into its 
handling of the pandemic.116 
The coupling of supply side shortages with the public’s disquiet, and 
even among some, zealous opposition, to vaccination presents policymakers 
with a difficult dilemma: how can they speed up and increase the supply of 
vaccine during a pandemic while ensuring that the public will accept the 
vaccine when it is offered?  In other words, can public health officials err on 
the side of precaution when it comes to pandemic vaccines without 
undermining the public’s support for vaccination?  Section Three looks at 
the legal strategies that have been employed to address these issues on the 
supply side.  Section Four looks at the tools that have been used or 
contemplated to resolve the problem on the demand side.  As the discussion 
below suggests, both sets of legal strategies risk exacerbating the chasm 
between public health officials and the public. 
 
 111. BROOKES, supra note 90, at 32-33. 
 112. PEW RESEARCH CENTER FOR PEOPLE & THE PRESS, DISTRUST, DISCONTENT, ANGER AND 
PARTISAN RANCOR: THE PEOPLE AND THEIR GOVERNMENT 1 (2010), available at http://people-
press.org/reports/pdf/606.pdf [hereinafter THE PEOPLE AND THEIR GOVERNMENT] (reporting on 
polls showing that “[b]y almost every conceivable measure Americans are less positive and 
more critical of government these days” and that only twenty-two percent of the public has 
favorable views of banks and financial institutions, and only twenty-five percent has a 
favorable view of large corporations). 
 113. SteelFisher et al., supra note 8, at e65(2). 
 114. Id. at e65(3). 
 115. E.g., Cohen & Carter, supra note 1, at 1274; Jeff Levy, Did the World Health 
Organization Exaggerate the H1N1 Flu Threat?, NEW JERSEY NEWSROOM (June 10, 2010), 
http://www.newjerseynewsroom.com/pdf/healthquest/did-the-world-health-organization-
exaggerate-the-h1n1-flu-threat.pdf. 
 116. See Cohen & Carter, supra note 1, at 1279. 
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PART THREE: SUPPLY SIDE LEGAL STRATEGIES 
A. Federal Investment and Regulatory “Reform” 
 Believing that quick and widespread availability of vaccines is critical to 
combating a pandemic, the federal government has pursued a number of 
legal strategies to increase the supply of vaccine.117  Perhaps the least 
controversial policy has been the injection of federal money directly into 
vaccine development and sales.118  As noted above, vaccines are not an 
especially profitable enterprise for pharmaceutical companies; they are 
expensive to produce and are used with less regularity than most 
“blockbuster” drugs.119  These problems are exacerbated in the case of 
vaccines for diseases that primarily affect the developing world,120 as well as 
in the case of pandemics that may or may not occur.  As a result, private 
companies, operating without government support, are apt to invest less 
than optimal amounts (from a public health perspective) in vaccine research 
and development. 
Assuming that the private market does not support what health officials 
believe to be an adequate investment in vaccines,121 the federal government 
invests heavily in vaccine development.122  It also acts as a large purchaser 
of vaccines, helping to ensure a steady demand.  For example, the 1993 
Vaccines for Children Program provides federally purchased vaccines to 
 
 117. Efforts to increase the supply of vaccine have primarily come from the federal 
government; hence this section focuses on federal laws and policies.  In contrast, efforts to 
compel vaccination have originated in both the federal and state arenas.  Thus Section Four, 
which looks at demand side laws, considers both federal and state legal issues. 
 118. As Lawrence Gostin has noted, ethical questions should be raised about the amount 
of money the government has allocated to the development of pandemic flu vaccine in 
comparison to spending on “chronically underfund[ed] more cost-effective public health 
services.”  Lawrence O. Gostin, Swine Flu Vaccine: What Is Fair?, HASTINGS CTR. REP., 
Sept/Oct 2009, at 9, 9. 
 119. For a more detailed discussion of why vaccines provide relatively low levels of profits 
to pharmaceutical companies, see BROOKES, supra note 90, at 34-35. 
 120. See, e.g., OWEN BARDER, RUGH LEVINE, MICHAEL KREMER, CTR. FOR GLOBAL DEV., 
MAKING MARKETS FOR VACCINES: IDEAS TO ACTION 3 (2005), available at http://www.cgdev. 
org/doc/books/vaccine/MakingMarkets-complete.pdf. 
 121. Most vaccines are partial public goods; they benefit not only those who are 
vaccinated but others.  For this reason alone, it is unlikely that private investment alone can 
achieve an efficient and adequate allocation of vaccines.  See FINANCING VACCINES, supra 
note 98, at 41, 43. 
 122. After 2001 and prior to 2005’s focus on pandemic planning, the federal government 
enhanced its investment in vaccines and other bioterrorist “countermeasures.”  See, e.g., 
Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 
107-188, 116 Stat. 594 (2002); Project Bioshield Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-276, 118 
Stat. 835 (2004) [hereinafter Project Bioshield]. 
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millions of children.123  As a result, as of 2004, the federal government 
purchased between fifty-two percent and fifty-five percent of all childhood 
vaccines, helping to make vaccines widely available to children while also 
ensuring a market for producers.124 
The federal government has employed a similar mix of investment and 
purchasing programs to secure pandemic vaccine.  In 2005, Congress 
allocated $3.3 billion to DHHS for pandemic planning, including vaccine 
development and stockpiling.125  By December 2006, DHHS had obligated 
$1.3 billion on vaccine-related activities.126  This money was spent primarily 
on supporting vaccine development and procuring pre-pandemic vaccines 
for the national stockpile.127  In 2009, in response to the H1N1 pandemic, 
the federal government purchased the H1N1 vaccine, helping to ensure that 
manufacturers would produce it.128 
Congress has also sought to address supply problems by easing what 
producers cite as regulatory burdens on the manufacture of pandemic 
vaccines.  In 2004, Project BioShield Act amended the Food, Drug, and 
Cosmetic Act129 to permit the Secretary of DHHS, after declaring a public 
health emergency, to authorize the emergency use of drugs, medical 
devices, and biological products (including vaccines) that have not yet been 
licensed or approved for use, or have not been licensed or approved for a 
 
 123. 42 U.S.C. § 1396s (2006).  In fact, public support for vaccination, and its forerunner, 
inoculation, dates back to colonial times.  See Wendy E. Parmet, Health Care and the 
Constitution: Public Health and the Role of the State in the Framing Era, 20 HASTINGS CONST. 
L.Q. 267, 286-99. 
 124. See FINANCING VACCINES, supra note 98, at 47.  The government’s large presence in 
the vaccine market, however, can also deter production since the government is able, as a 
large purchaser, to extract lower prices than would private payers.  Hence government 
purchasing may have both positive and negative impacts on supply.  See id. at 5-6. 
 125. U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., REPORT TO CONGRESS: PANDEMIC INFLUENZA 
PREPAREDNESS SPENDING, CONFERENCE REPORT 109-359, at 1 (2006), available at 
https://www.medicalcountermeasures.gov/BARDA/documents/hhspanfluspending-0612.pdf 
[hereinafter CONFERENCE REPORT]. 
 126. In December 2005, Congress allocated $3.3 billion to HHS for pandemic planning.  
HHS reported that, as of December 2006, it had obligated $1.3 billion on vaccine-related 
activities.  Id. at 3.  See Michael O. Leavitt, Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., The 
HHS Pandemic Influenza Plan before the Committee on Energy and Commerce, U.S. House 
of Representatives (Nov. 8, 2005). 
 127. U.S. POLICY, supra note 101, at 2. 
 128. See Dooren, supra note 62, at D4.  However, as interest in the vaccine waned, the 
federal government exercised provisions in some of its contracts to reduce its orders.  Simeon 
Bennett & Tom Randall, U.S. Trims Vaccine Order from CSL as Interest Wanes (Update 2), 
BLOOMBERG NEWS (Jan. 11, 2010), http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive 
&sid=aNl27tKpye4g. 
 129. 21 U.S.C. § 301 (2006). 
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particular use (so-called “off-label” use).130  By allowing the Secretary of 
HHS to waive ordinary licensing requirements, the emergency use 
authorization (EUA) procedure allows manufacturers to bring vaccines and 
other so-called countermeasures to market before they are fully tested.131  
Without this procedure, such vaccines could only be used as investigational 
drugs, necessitating informed consent and all of the protections typically 
provided subjects of human research.132  By allowing potentially wide use of 
unlicensed vaccines without requiring those legal protections, the EUA 
procedure speeds the process and lowers the cost of production and 
distribution, theoretically enabling the rapid deployment of pharmaceutical 
interventions necessary to respond to a public health emergency. 
During the H1N1 pandemic, the EUA procedure was utilized, although 
not for vaccines.  On April 26, 2009, Secretary Sebelius issued an EUA for 
certain antiviral medications, personal respiratory devices, and diagnostic 
tests.133  This declaration was updated numerous times.134  Commentators 
also speculated that an EUA would be issued for the vaccine, especially if it 
contained an adjuvant, an ingredient that can be added to a vaccine to 
boost its effectiveness, thereby stretching supplies.135 Ultimately the FDA 
licensed the H1N1 vaccine without any adjuvant, and without waiting for full 
clinical trials, reasoning that the vaccine was not fundamentally different 
than the seasonal flu vaccine.136 Nevertheless, the discussion of a possible 
EUA, and the decision to license the vaccine without full testing, may have 
 
 130. 21 U.S.C. § 360bbb-3 (2006). 
 131. The Act also allows the Secretary to impose conditions on the use of such products.  
For a more detailed discussion, see Susan E. Sherman, Joseph Foster & Sonal Vaid, 
Emergency Use Authority and 2009 H1N1 Influenza, 7 BIOSECURITY & BIOTERRORISM: 
BIODEFENSE STRATEGY, PRAC. & SCI. 245, 245 (2009). 
 132. Sandra Crouse Quinn et al., Public Willingness to Take A Vaccine or Drug Under 
Emergency Use Authorization During the 2009 H1N1 Pandemic, 7 BIOSECURITY & 
BIOTERRORISM: BIODEFENSE STRATEGY, PRAC. & SCI. 275, 276, 277 (2009). 
 133. See Sherman, Foster & Vaid, supra note 131, at 249. 
 134. KATHLEEN SEBELIUS, SEC’Y, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., DECLARATION OF AN 
EMERGENCY PURSUANT TO SECTION 564 OF THE FEDERAL FOOD, DRUG, AND COSMETIC ACT, 21 
U.S.C. § 360BBB-3(B) (2010), available at http://www.fda.gov/downloads/EmergencyPrepared 
ness/Counterterrorism/UCM206802.pdf.  For a more detailed discussion, see Sherman, 
Foster & Vaid, supra note 131, at 249-50. 
 135. Quinn et al., supra note 132, at 277.  Because there is no influenza vaccine with an 
adjuvant currently licensed in the U.S., an EUA would have been required if the federal 
government had decided to go ahead and order vaccine using an adjuvant.  Id. 
 136. See General Questions and Answers on 2009 H1N1 Influenza Vaccine Safety, CTRS. 
FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION (Dec. 15, 2009), http://www.cdc.gov/h1N1flu/ 
vaccination/vaccine_safety_qa.htm#e.  Earlier an FDA advisory committee had concluded 
that the H1N1 vaccine would be sufficiently similar to the seasonal flu vaccine that it could be 
used without waiting for the results of full-scale clinical trials.  See Dooren & Winning, supra 
note 61. 
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helped to fuel a public perception that the vaccine was rushed and 
untested.137 
B. Liability Protections 
Vaccine manufacturers and federal health policymakers have long 
argued that tort liability creates a barrier to an adequate supply of vaccine.  
The argument and the debate surrounding vaccine liability dates back to the 
1950s’ campaign to vaccinate children against polio when a contaminated 
lot of the Salk vaccine killed at least ten people and paralyzed 164.138  In 
the litigation that ensued, courts began to impose strict liability on the 
vaccine’s manufacturers.139  Then in the 1960s and 1970s, appellate courts 
held that vaccine makers had a duty to warn patients of a vaccine’s 
potential dangers.140 
Not surprisingly, manufacturers and the companies that insured them 
were not pleased.  Hence, when the Ford Administration decided to 
vaccinate the entire population against swine flu, insurance companies 
refused to provide liability coverage to manufacturers.141  Manufacturers, in 
turn, refused to produce or distribute vaccine unless the government 
removed their risk of liability.142  When an outbreak of Legionnaire’s disease 
was initially (incorrectly) feared to be the swine flu that was detected at Fort 
Dix, Congress capitulated to manufacturers’ demands, relieving them of 
liability by creating an exclusive remedy against the United States for 
personal injuries and death caused by the vaccine.143  As a result, when 
cases of Guillain-Barré syndrome arose among those who were vaccinated, 
federal taxpayers, not manufacturers or insurers, were left to bear the 
cost.144 
The 1976 program set a precedent and taught a lesson.  The precedent 
was that vaccine manufacturers would demand and receive liability 
protection in order to maintain an adequate supply of vaccine.145  The 
 
 137. See text accompanying notes 237-39 infra. 
 138. See PAUL A. OFFIT, THE CUTTER INCIDENT: HOW AMERICA’S FIRST POLIO VACCINE LED TO 
THE GROWING VACCINE CRISIS 89 (2005). 
 139. Id. at 133-54. 
 140. E.g., Reyes v. Wyeth Labs., 498 F.2d. 1264 (5th Cir. 1974); Davis v. Wyeth Labs., 
399 F.2d 121 (9th Cir. 1968). 
 141. NEUSTADT & FINEBERG, supra note 20, at 48-56. 
 142. Id.  Indeed, manufacturers demanded that liability protection be afforded by act of 
Congress.  Contractual assurances of indemnification were insufficient to assure their 
cooperation in the program.  Id. at 59-62. 
 143. 42 U.S.C. § 247b(j)-(l) (1976). 
 144. See Joanna B. Apolinsky & Jeffrey A. Van Detta, Rethinking Liability for Vaccine Injury, 
19 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 537, 548-49 (2010). 
 145. See id. at 548. 
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lesson was that the government’s assumption of liability created significant 
costs for the federal treasury.  In response, since 1976, Congress has 
consistently coupled liability protection for vaccine makers with limitations 
on compensation for injured parties.146  For the most part, this coupling has 
occurred in the context of limited no-fault compensation schemes that, at 
least theoretically, provide faster and more efficient (if less generous) relief 
to injured parties.  In other words, the schemes provide some benefits to 
both injured individuals and the federal government.147  For example, the 
1986 National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act (NCVIA)148 requires plaintiffs 
seeking more than $1,000 in damages for injuries related to covered 
vaccines to file their claim initially before the National Vaccine Injury 
Compensation Program (VICP).149  Under this program, claimants who 
suffer from so-called “table injuries,”150 injuries that are widely recognized 
as clearly associated with vaccines and are listed on an approved table, can 
receive compensation relatively quickly, without needing to prove 
causation.151  Recovery, however, is limited to economic damages plus 
$250,000 for pain and suffering or death.152  For so-called “non-table” 
injuries, claimants can file a claim before a special master of the Federal 
Court of Claims (the so-called Vaccine Court) and try to prove that the 
vaccine caused the injury.153  In contrast to the 1976 swine flu program, 
compensation for claims paid under NCVIA is financed by a special excise 
tax on vaccines.154  Importantly, while NCVIA creates significant barriers and 
disincentives to bringing a civil lawsuit, it does not preclude aggrieved 
individuals from having their day in court.  Parties who receive no award, or 
are dissatisfied with their award from the Vaccine Court, can seek review 
from the Federal Court of Claims and then the Federal Circuit.155  
Claimants can also eventually bring a civil case in state or federal court, but 
actions are barred for injuries that were “unavoidable” or for a vaccine 
 
 146. Id. at 554, 555, 557. 
 147. Id. at 557-58. 
 148. 42 U.S.C. §§ 300aa-10-300aa-34 (2006).  For a critique of  NCVIA, see Mary 
Holland, Reconsidering Compulsory Childhood Vaccination, 24-26, 31-32 (N.Y.U. Sch. Law, 
Working Paper No. 10-64, 2010), available at http://ssrn.com/abstracts=1677565. 
 149. 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-11(a)(2)(A). 
 150. 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-14. 
 151. 42 U.S.C. §§ 300aa-33(6)(B), 300aa-13(a), 300aa-15.  For an explanation and 
listing of table injuries, see National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program, Vaccine Injury 
Table, HEALTH RESOURCES & SERVS. ADMIN., http://www.hrsa.gov/vaccinecompensation/ 
table.htm. 
 152. 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-15. 
 153. Id. at § 300aa-11. 
 154. Id. at § 300aa-14. 
 155. Id. at §§ 300aa-12; 300aa-21. 
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maker’s failure to provide direct warnings to a customer.156  Thus, strict 
liability claims are greatly diminished, if not barred.  In 2009, in Bruesewitz 
v. Wyeth, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Court held that 
NCVIA also preempts all state law design defect claims.157  The Supreme 
Court recently affirmed that ruling.158 
Although vaccine critics initially lauded NCVIA for providing a quick and 
efficient remedy to individuals injured by vaccines,159 they have more 
recently assailed the program.160  In part, their criticism stems from the fact 
that the Act places the United States in the position of defending vaccines, 
and in recent years, the government has done so zealously.161  Moreover, 
the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which reviews 
decisions of the Federal Court of Claims, has imposed relatively stringent 
causation requirements upon claimants trying to prove non-table injuries.162  
In addition, changes made by DHHS to the vaccine injury table in the 1990s 
led to an increasing number of non-table claims.163  The fact that thousands 
of cases alleging that vaccines caused autism languished for years before 
the Vaccine Court concluded that vaccines do not cause autism164 also 
 
 156. Id. at § 300aa-22. 
 157. Bruesewitz v. Wyeth, 561 F.3d 233 (3d Cir. 2009), aff’d 2011 WL 588789 (Feb. 22, 
2011). 
 158. As this paper was in press, the Supreme Court decided Bruesewitz v. Wyeth, 2011 WL 
588789 (Feb. 22, 2011) (holding that NCVIA preempts state design defect claims). 
 159. At the time, most of the controversy related to whole-cell pertussis vaccine, which 
continued to be used in the United States even though a safer, acellular form of the vaccine 
was feasible.  For a more detailed discussion, see ALLEN, supra note 105, at 251-93. 
 160. Of course, whether claimants’ injuries are related to vaccines is precisely the question 
on which vaccine critics and public health policymakers remain deeply divided. 
 161. In 1999, leading vaccine critic Barbara Loe Fisher criticized HHS’ role, arguing that 
the agency had used its discretionary authority to undermine the intent of NCVIA and had 
created an “uneven playing field.”  Compensating Vaccine Injuries: Are Reforms Needed?: 
Hearing Before the H. Subcomm. on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy and Human Resources, 
106th Cong. (1999) (statement of Barbara Loe Fisher, Co-Founder and President, National 
Vaccine Information Center), available at http://www.whale.to/m/fisher88.html. 
 162. De Bazan v. Sec’y Health & Human Servs., 539 F.3d 1347, 1351-52 (Fed. Cir. 
2008). 
 163. James B. Currier, Too Sick, Too Soon?: The Causation Burden Under the National 
Vaccine Injury Compensation Program Following De Bezan v. Secretary of Health & Human 
Services, 19 FED. CIR. B.J. 229, 247 (2009). 
 164. Due to the number and complexity of autism-related cases, the Vaccine Court 
established several test cases that would serve to decide key questions, such as whether 
particular vaccines cause autism.  For a more detailed discussion, see Hazelhurst v. Sec’y 
Health & Human Servs., 604 F.3d 1343, 1345-54 (Fed. Cir. 2010).  In the last two years, the 
Vaccine Court has handed down a series of decisions in test cases, all of which have held that 
claimants failed to prove that vaccines caused their neurological deficits.  See, e.g., id.; 
Cedillo v. Sec’y Health & Human Servs., 89 Fed. Cl. 158, 182-83 (Fed. Cl. 2009), aff’d 617 
F.3d 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2010); Synder v. Sec’y Health & Human Servs., 88 Fed. Cl. 706, 745-
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soured the faith of parents who fervently believed that vaccines are linked to 
autism. 
Despite its limitations, NCVIA is more generous to claimants than 
subsequent statutes limiting the liability of vaccine producers.165  For 
example, Section 302 of the Homeland Security Act,166 enacted in 2002, 
created an exclusive remedy against the United States for injuries caused by 
the smallpox vaccine following a declaration by the Secretary of Homeland 
Security.167  However, the scope of Section 302’s liability protection and 
compensation provisions were unclear.168  In contrast to NCVIA, Section 
302 did not provide no-fault compensation for those who were injured; 
rather claimants had to demonstrate that the manufacturer or other covered 
entity had been negligent.169  Given the relatively high rate of adverse 
events associated with the smallpox vaccine, and the fact that there were no 
naturally-occurring cases of smallpox, Section 302’s failure to provide clear 
and adequate compensation is thought to have deterred many health care 
workers and others from participating in the Bush Administration’s 2002-
2003 smallpox vaccine campaign.170 
In the spring of 2003, Congress responded to Section 302’s limitations 
by enacting the Smallpox Emergency Personnel Protection Act of 2003 
 
46 (Fed. Cl. 2009).  In at least one case, however, the federal government entered into a 
settlement with parents of child who had a rare mitochondrial defect and claimed that a 
vaccine, in conjunction with her defect, led to autism-like injuries.  See Gardiner Harris, Deal 
in an Autism Case Fuels Debate on Vaccines, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 8, 2008, at A9. 
 165. A full discussion of the liability-limiting statutes and regulations that may be applied to 
vaccines is beyond the scope of this article.  Other provisions that might have been used for 
pandemic vaccines, in the absence of the laws discussed infra, include Pub. L. 85-804, which 
authorized Executive Order 10789, allowing for indemnification of federal contractors for 
losses “arising out of or resulting from risks that the contract defines as unusually hazardous or 
nuclear in nature.”  Exec. Order No. 13232, 66 C.F.R. 206 (2001) (expanding 
indemnification under Exec. Order 10789 to contractors with the Department of Health and 
Human Services); Support Anti-Terrorism by Fostering Effective Technologies Act of 2002, 6 
U.S.C. § 441(b) (2006), which provides broad liability protections for anti-terrorism 
technologies.  See Kevin P. Mullen, Extraordinary Contractual Relief: Public Law 85-804 in the 
Homeland Security Era, 37 PROCUREMENT LAW., Summer 2001, at 1, 9. 
 166. Science and Technology in Support of Homeland Security, 6 U.S.C. § 182(2) (2006). 
 167. Homeland Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 233(p) (2006). 
 168. See Michael Greenberger, The 800 Pound Gorilla Sleeps: The Federal Government’s 
Lackadaisical Liability and Compensation Policies in the Context of Pre-Event Vaccine 
Immunization Programs, 8 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL’Y 7, 17-19 (2005). 
 169. Id. at 18. 
 170. COMM. ON SMALLPOX VACCINATION PROGRAM IMPLEMENTATION, INST. OF MED., THE 
SMALLPOX VACCINATION PROGRAM: PUBLIC HEALTH IN AN AGE OF TERRORISM 51-52 (2005).  If 
the threat of smallpox had been more apparent, more people may have been willing to risk 
the vaccine, despite the uncertainty of compensation. 
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(SEPPA),171 which established a no-fault remedy for injuries listed on a 
smallpox vaccine injury table.172  However, SEPPA’s compensation program, 
which was administered by the Health Resources and Services 
Administration (HRSA), was substantially less generous than NCVIA’s.173  In 
particular, SEPPA limited compensation for lost income to two-thirds of the 
claimant’s income plus a modest addition if a claimant had a dependent.174  
Moreover, SEPPA capped lost income awards at $50,000 per year, and 
$262,100 (as of 2003) for a lifetime if the claimant did not have a 
permanent disability.175  As of 2003, death benefits were also limited to 
$262,100, or an annual payment of $50,000, until the youngest dependent 
turned eighteen.176  In addition, in contrast to NCVIA, SEPPA’s remedy was 
exclusive and unreviewable.177  Claimants who were unhappy with their 
award could not bring a civil action; nor could they obtain review in any 
court.178 
Undoubtedly SEPPA was the model Congress used in 2005 when it 
enacted the Public Readiness and Emergency Preparedness Act (PREPA).179  
Testifying before the House Committee on Energy and Commerce about 
pandemic preparedness in November 2005, DHHS Secretary Michael O. 
Leavitt explained the rationale for the act, which was passed as part of a 
Department of Defense Appropriations bill:180 
[A]s we seek to build domestic [vaccine] manufacturing capacity, we also 
know that the threat of liability exposure is too often a barrier to willingness 
to participate in the vaccine business. . . . It is crucial that those engaged in 
this work be shielded from unwarranted tort suits.  Accordingly, the 
Administration is proposing limited liability protections for vaccine 
manufacturers and providers, with an exception to allow suits to proceed 
against companies who act with willful misconduct.181 
 
 171. 42 U.S.C. § 239 (2006). 
 172. 42 U.S.C. § 233(p)(2)(B) (2006). 
 173. See Greenberger, supra note 168, at 20. 
 174. Id. 
 175. Id. 
 176. Id. 
 177. See 42 U.S.C. § 239a(f)(2) (2006). 
 178. Id. 
 179. 42 U.S.C. § 247d (2006). 
 180. See Department of Defense, Emergency Supplemental Appropriations to Address 
Hurricanes in the Gulf of Mexico, and Pandemic Influenza Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-148, 
119 Stat. 2818 (2005).  For further discussion about the Act’s legislative history, see Apolinsky 
and Van Detta, supra note 144, at 559-62. 
 181. Assessing the National Pandemic Flu Preparedness Plan: Hearing Before the Comm. 
on Energy and Commerce, 109th Cong. 20 (2005) (statement of Michael O. Leavitt, 
Secretary, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services). 
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The statute that Congress then quickly passed provides remarkably broad 
immunity to the manufacturers and distributors of vaccines and other so-
called countermeasures whenever the Secretary of HHS “makes a 
determination that a disease or other health condition or other threat to 
health constitutes a public health emergency, or that there is a credible risk 
that the disease, condition, or threat may in the future constitute such an 
emergency.”182  Importantly, the statute does not define the terms “public 
health emergency” or “credible risk.”183  As a result, almost any potential 
threat could provide the basis for a PREPA declaration.184  Moreover, the 
Secretary’s decision to issue a declaration under PREPA is totally 
unreviewable185 and the declaration can last for as long as the Secretary 
specifies.186  Hence, the Secretary theoretically can issue a declaration 
stating that cancer constitutes a public health emergency warranting the 
Act’s protection for the manufacturers of all cancer medications for an 
indefinite period of time. 
Once a PREPA declaration is issued, all civil litigation against 
manufacturers and administrators of a covered vaccine, or other covered 
countermeasure, is barred, except in cases of “willful misconduct.”187  In 
addition, PREPA includes several broad defenses available if a willful 
misconduct claim is brought.188  For example, the Act states that an act or 
omission by a manufacturer that is subject to regulation by FDA shall not 
constitute willful misconduct if neither the Secretary of DHHS, nor the 
Attorney General, has initiated an enforcement action with respect to such 
act or omission.189 
Following the pattern of previous vaccine-liability acts, PREPA also 
established, but did not fund, a no-fault compensation scheme to be 
administered by HRSA.190  The Act incorporates SEPPA’s compensation 
 
 182. 42 U.S.C. § 247d-6d(b) (2006). 
 183. See id. at § 247d-6d. 
 184. The statute does provide factors to be considered in issuing a declaration.  These 
include “the desirability of encouraging the design, development, clinical testing or 
investigation, manufacture, labeling, distribution, formulation, packaging, marketing, 
promotion, sale, purchase, donation, dispensing, prescribing, administration, licensing, and 
use of such countermeasure.”  Id. at § 247d-6d(b)(6).  In other words, the Secretary is told to 
consider facts relevant to the supply of a countermeasure.  The statute does not help define 
what constitutes a public health threat or a credible risk of such threat. 
 185. Id. at § 247d-6d(b)(7). 
 186. Id. at § 247d-6d(b)(2)(B).  It can also be renewed or amended as the Secretary sees 
fit, although it cannot be amended to retroactively rescind liability protection.  Id at § 247d-
6d(b)(4). 
 187. 42 U.S.C. §§ 247d-6d(a)(1), 247d-6d(d)(1) (2006). 
 188. Id. at § 247d-6d(c)(4). 
 189. Id. at § 247d-6d(c)(5). 
 190. Id. at § 247d-6e(a) (incorporating SEPPA’s compensation provisions). 
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provisions, except that in contrast to SEPPA, dependents of the deceased 
can obtain lost income benefits in lieu of death benefits.191  Moreover, as 
with SEPPA, HRSA’s decision with respect to a claim, as well as the 
Secretary’s decision to invoke PREPA’s immunity, appear to be 
unreviewable.192  If an individual, after having exhausted his or her remedies 
with HRSA is dissatisfied, he or she is limited to bringing a claim for willful 
misconduct.193 
In 2007, the Secretary of DHHS invoked PREPA’s protections for 
countermeasures developed or used in connection with H5N1 avian 
influenza virus.194  This was done even though, at the time, no money had 
been appropriated to the HRSA compensation fund and no regulations 
existed to handle any claims that might have been submitted.  At the start of 
the H1N1 outbreak, on June 15, 2009, the Secretary of DHHS invoked 
PREPA to extend the protections previously provided to the producers and 
administrators of the H5N1 vaccine to those who made or administered the 
H1N1 vaccine.195  Shortly thereafter, on June 24, President Obama signed 
a supplemental appropriations act that allocated $7.65 billion to DHHS for 
the H1N1 pandemic and authorized the transfer of funds to PREPA’s 
compensation program.196  However, as of May 2010, HRSA had yet to 
finalize regulations governing the claims process.197  Thus, more than one 
year after the onset of the pandemic, and more than ten months after the 
vaccines were licensed, claimants with significant injuries could file a notice 
 
 191. Id. at § 247d-6e(b)(3). 
 192. 42 U.S.C. § 247b-6b(6)(7) (2006).  The statute requires exhaustion of its 
administrative remedy and makes that remedy exclusive, except for the limited remedy for 
willful misconduct claims.  A court, however, might read the denial of review narrowly so as to 
not preclude review under the Administrative Procedures Act or 28 U.S.C. § 1331.  Cf. 
Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S. 591, 603-04 (1988) (reading a statute denying review of an 
employee’s termination claims narrowly so as not to preclude review of employee’s 
constitutional claims). 
 193. 42 U.S.C. § 247d-6e(d). 
 194. Pandemic Countermeasures; Declaration Under the Public Readiness and Emergency 
Preparedness Act, 72 FED. REG. 4710 (Feb. 1, 2007). 
 195. Pandemic Influenza Vaccines Amendment, 74 FED. REG. 30,294 (June 25, 2009).  
The declaration also extended protection to so-called “program planners.”  Id.  This 
declaration was extended on Sept. 28, 2009, and again on February 26, 2010.  Dep’t Health 
& Human Servs., Pandemic Influenza Vaccines Amendment, 75 FED. REG. 10,268 (Mar. 5, 
2010). 
 196. See Pub. L. No. 111-32, 123 Stat. 1859 (2009). 
 197. Public Readiness and Emergency Preparedness Act Countermeasures Injury 
Compensation Program, Procedures for Submitting a Letter of Intent to File Requests for 
Benefits, 75 FED REG. 26,773-74 (May 12, 2010). 
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to file a claim;198 however, they could not actually have their claims 
processed, never mind be heard in court, unless they could establish willful 
misconduct.199 
PART FOUR: USING LAW TO INCREASE DEMAND 
An ample supply of vaccine is insufficient to mitigate a pandemic.200  
The population that is at risk must also be willing (even grudgingly) to be 
vaccinated.  If a pandemic is severe enough, or if populations perceive it as 
very dangerous, acceptance of a vaccine is not apt to be a problem.  
People will line up willingly, if not desperately, for a vaccine if they are 
sufficiently frightened of the disease it prevents.  Moreover, because a 
pandemic vaccine will almost invariably be in short supply at the beginning 
of a pandemic, the most significant problem policymakers usually face at 
the start of a pandemic is not a shortage of demand, but of supply.201  For 
this reason, public health policymakers and scholars have focused much of 
their preparedness efforts on developing plans for rationing pandemic 
vaccine.202 
 
 198. However, an injured individual can bring a claim in federal court, subject to PREPA’s 
many defenses and limitations, if he or she can show “willful misconduct.”  See text 
accompanying notes 187-89, supra. 
 199. 42 U.S.C. § 247d-6d(d) (2006).  See also note 197, supra. 
 200. Of course, as noted above, the supply of vaccine will almost always be insufficient 
during the early months of a pandemic.  See text accompanying notes 88-100, supra.  
Because of the shortage in the early fall of 2009, CDC released vaccine to state health 
authorities, recommending that priority be given to certain high risk groups, including health 
care workers, pregnant women, and children with chronic diseases.  See Press Release, CDC 
Advisors Make Recommendations for Use of Vaccine Against Novel H1N1, CTRS. FOR DISEASE 
CONTROL & PREVENTION (July 29, 2009), http://www.cdc.gov/media/pressrel/2009/r090 
729b.htm. 
 201. See text accompanying notes 88-100, supra. 
 202. For example, in 2005, the Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices (ACIP) and 
the National Vaccine Advisory Committee provided recommendations to HHS on how to 
prioritize vaccine distribution during an influenza pandemic.  Those recommendations listed 
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healthy individuals between the ages of two and sixty-four, who were not in another category 
by virtue of their occupation, were at the bottom of the list.  See U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & 
HUMAN SERVS., HHS Pandemic Influenza Plan D-10 tbl.1 (2005) [hereinafter Pandemic 
Influenza Plan], available at http://www.hhs.gov/pandemicflu/plan/pdf/AppD.pdf.  
Nevertheless, during the H1N1 outbreak, that plan turned out to be of limited utility, since the 
groups most affected by the virus (especially children) were not those who had been expected 
to be at greatest risk.  Hence in July 2009, the ACIP recommended that the H1N1 vaccine be 
initially given to pregnant women, caregivers of young children, people between six months 
and twenty-four years of age, and adults younger than twenty-four with chronic health 
problems, who were not prioritized in earlier pandemic plans.  Press Release, CDC Advisors 
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Although shortages of vaccine are likely at the start of a pandemic, 
public health emergency plans have also focused on using law to mandate 
vaccination of individuals who choose not to be vaccinated.203 The use of 
law to compel vaccination is not new.  Since the 19th century, public health 
officials have employed both law and sometimes brute force to impose 
vaccination on the unwilling.204  The use of law to penalize an individual 
who refuses vaccination during a public health emergency, subject to some 
exceptions, was famously upheld by the Supreme Court in 1905 in 
Jacobson v. Massachusetts.205  In 1922, in Zucht v. King, the Supreme 
Court cited Jacobson in upholding a state law that required children to be 
vaccinated in order to attend school.206  Despite this precedent, school 
vaccination laws were not widespread until the 1970s when the federal 
government urged states to enact them.207 
In the fall of 2001, in the aftermath of the 9/11 and anthrax attacks, the 
CDC asked the Centers for the Law and the Public’s Health at Georgetown 
and Johns Hopkins Universities to draft a Model State Emergency Health 
Powers Act (MSEHPA).208  The draft that emerged proposed granting state 
public health officials the authority to isolate individuals who refused 
vaccination during a public health emergency.209  Many states have since 
adopted this proposal.210 
 
Make Recommendations for Use of Vaccine Against Novel H1N1, supra note 200.  This 
recommendation was largely (but not totally) followed by states in the fall of 2009.  
Considerable consternation arose when the press reported that certain Wall Street firms and 
other businesses were able to procure vaccine supplies for their employees, even while 
supplies remained short for many high risk individuals.  See, e.g., Bill Berkrot, Flu Shots for 
Wall Street Stirs Ire In New York, REUTERS, Nov. 6, 2009, http://www.reuters.com/article/idU 
SN0512995020091105; Esmé E. Deprez, New York Businesses Get H1N1 Vaccine, 
BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK, Nov. 2, 2009, http://www.businessweek.com/bwdaily/dnflash/ 
content/nov2009/db2009112_606442.htm. 
 203. See text accompanying notes 211-22, infra. 
 204. James. G. Hodge, Jr. & Lawrence O. Gostin, School Vaccination Requirements: 
Historical, Social, and Legal Perspectives, 90 KY. L.J. 831, 845-53 (2001-2002); Wendy K. 
Mariner, George J. Annas & Wendy E. Parmet, Pandemic Preparedness: A Return to the Rule 
of Law, 1 DREXEL L. REV. 341, 351-54 (2009). 
 205. Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 39 (1905). 
 206. Zucht v. King, 260 U.S. 174, 175 (1922). 
 207. ALLEN, supra note 105, at 245-47. 
 208. CTR. FOR LAW & PUBLIC’S HEALTH AT GEORGETOWN & JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITIES, 
MODEL STATE EMERGENCY HEALTH POWERS ACT 1 (2001), available at http://www.publichelath 
law.net/MSEHPA/MSEHPA2.pdf. 
 209. Id. at 27. 
 210. See CTR. FOR LAW & PUBLIC’S HEALTH AT GEORGETOWN & JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITIES, 
MODEL STATE EMERGENCY HEALTH POWERS ACT LEGISLATIVE SURVEILLANCE TABLE (2006), available 
at http://www.publichealthlaw.net/MSEHPA/MSEHPA%22Surveillance.pdf. 
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The federal pandemic planning documents developed in 2005 and 
2006 did not emphasize compulsory vaccination, but they did hint at its 
possibility.  For example, under the heading of “legal preparedness,” 
DHHS’s November 2005 Implementation Plan advised state and local 
public health agencies to “[d]etermine whether state and local laws allow 
mandatory vaccination to [sic] protect public health, if needed.”211 
During the actual 2009 H1N1 outbreak, no jurisdictions appear to have 
used their public health emergency laws to compel population-wide 
vaccination.212  In Massachusetts, however, controversy ensued when the 
state legislature debated a modified version of the MSEHPA, stoking fears 
that the state was seeking the authority to compel vaccination.213  In New 
York, Health Commissioner Richard F. Daines promulgated an emergency 
regulation requiring hospital workers who had contact with patients to be 
vaccinated against both seasonal flu and H1N1.214  In contrast to standing 
regulations in other states, such as those in Massachusetts, this regulation 
did not permit workers to decline vaccination unless it was medically 
contraindicated.215  New York’s regulation, which was issued before the 
H1N1 vaccine was available, was met with fear and anger by health care 
workers, many of whom resented the state’s imposition on their liberty and 
 
 211. Pandemic Influenza Plan, supra note 202, at S6-S9 (2005). 
 212. This statement is based on a widespread review of media reports of the outbreak in 
the “major papers” library of LexisNexis plus a review in January 2010 of state regulatory 
documents in LexisNexis’ “state administrative codes and registers” library.  See 2009 H1N1 
(Swine Flu) Legal Preparedness and Response, CTRS. FOR LAW & PUBLIC’S HEALTH (Jan. 27, 
2010), http://www.publichealthlaw.net/Projects/swinefluphl.php. 
 213. Steven Smith, In Public Health Bill, a Contagion of Fear, State Rebuts Talk of Forced 
Injections, BOSTON GLOBE, Sept. 17, 2009, at A1.  Since the fall of 2009, the bill has 
languished in a deadlocked conference committee.  Kyle Cheney, Prospects for Pandemic 
Preparedness Bill Grim as Session Winds Down, BOSTON.COM (July 26, 2010), 
http://www.boston.com/news/health/articles/2009/09/17/in_public_health_bill_a_contagion
_of_fear/. 
 214. N.Y. Comp. Codes R. & Regs. tit. 10, § 66-3 (July 2009).  Without doubt, there is a 
strong public health rationale for vaccinating health care workers.  See Paris 
Nourmohammadi & Brigid Ryan, Shooting the Moon: Should States Require the H1N1 Vaccine 
for Healthcare Workers?, 7 J. EMERGENCY MGMT. 11, 11 (2009); Alexandra M. Stewart, 
Mandatory Vaccination of Health Care Workers, 361 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2015, 2015-17 
(2009). 
 215. Compare 105 MASS. CODE REGS. 130.325 (2010) (regulation requiring hospital 
workers to be vaccinated against influenza but providing medical and religious exemptions, as 
well as the right of workers to decline vaccinations) with N.Y. Comp. Codes R. & Regs. tit 10 § 
66-6 (2009) (providing an exemption from the mandatory vaccination requirement for health 
care workers for whom the vaccine is medically contraindicated). 
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feared the not-yet-licensed vaccine.216  At least four lawsuits were filed, 
charging the state with violating state administrative law principles as well as 
the plaintiffs’ constitutional rights.217  On October 16, 2009, a trial judge 
issued a temporary restraining order in two of the cases.218  Shortly 
thereafter, the state revoked the emergency regulation, citing the shortage of 
the H1N1 vaccine.219  After that, no other state mandated the H1N1 
vaccine, although many hospitals and other health care settings required 
their workers to be vaccinated.220  Some of these private sector mandates 
also provoked legal challenges, generally alleging violations of collective 
bargaining agreements and federal labor laws.221  Not surprisingly, these 
challenges also garnered a fair amount of media attention, casting further 
doubt on the safety and efficacy of the vaccine.222 
PART FIVE: VACCINE LAW, PUBLIC HEALTH POWERS AND PUBLIC TRUST 
In recent years, public health officials and public health scholars have 
appreciated the important role that law can play in safeguarding public 
health.223  This has led many to emphasize what has become known as 
“public health legal preparedness,” which stresses law’s vital role in 
responding to a public health emergency, such as a pandemic.224  In the 
case of pandemic vaccines, the focus on public health legal preparedness 
has spurred the enactment of several federal laws granting public health 
 
 216. Donald G. McNeil, Jr. & Karen Zraick, New York Health Care Workers Resist Flu 
Vaccine Rule, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 21, 2009, at A18.  See Parmet, Pandemic Vaccines—The 
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concerned because of a shortage of thimerosal-free H1N1 vaccine.  Some states have laws 
prohibiting the administration of vaccines with thimerosal to pregnant women and young 
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officials significant authority to dispense with the normal rules regarding the 
licensing and liability of pandemic vaccines.  In many states, public health 
legal preparedness has prompted the adoption of public health emergency 
laws, often modeled on the MSEHPA, authorizing health officials, upon the 
declaration of a public health emergency, to detain individuals who refuse 
to be vaccinated.  Supporters justify these laws as both practical responses 
to the supply and demand problems afflicting pandemic vaccines and as 
necessary corollaries to the widely stated belief that public health protection, 
especially during an emergency, requires the sacrifice of individual liberty.225  
In either case, these laws rely, to a significant degree, on a relatively simple 
vision of the relationship between law and public health, one that assumes 
that laws can protect a population’s health simply by granting officials 
power to undertake measures that are designed to prevent the spread of 
disease. 
In reality, law’s relationship to public health is far more complex.  
Without doubt, the informed exercise of public health authorities can often 
improve public health.226  But in order to do so, public health laws must do 
more than simply empower public officials; they need to foster a social 
environment that is supportive of health.  To do that, public health laws 
need to take account of and seek to improve the public’s perception of 
public health officials and other parties vital to the public health system, 
including pharmaceutical companies.  In other words, in order to protect 
public health, laws must promote, rather than erode, the public’s trust in the 
public health system.  This can be challenging in an era, such as the current 
one, in which there is widespread cynicism and distrust of both governments 
and large corporations.227 
It is especially important that pandemic preparedness laws inspire the 
public’s trust.228  As a practical matter, no matter how much authority 
officials are granted, laws cannot ensure that individuals wash their hands, 
cover their mouths when they cough, or stay at home if they have flu-like 
symptoms.  Nor can laws effectively compel masses to submit to a 
vaccination campaign or wait patiently while others at greater risk are 
vaccinated.  All of these health-promoting behaviors, which may be 
essential in the face of pandemic influenza, require the population’s trust in 
the public health system.  If public health emergency laws foster that trust, 
 
 225. For a more detailed discussion, see Mariner, Annas & Parmet, supra note 204, at 
354-55. 
 226. See Moulton, Goodman & Parmet, supra note 223, at 18. 
 227. See THE PEOPLE AND THEIR GOVERNMENT, supra note 112, at 1-6. 
 228. Heidi J. Larson & David L. Heymann, Public Health Response to Influenza A (H1N1) 
as an Opportunity to Build Public Trust, 303 JAMA 271, 271 (2010); Quinn et al., supra note 
132, at 287. 
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they may be able to achieve their goals.  But if public health laws erode the 
public’s trust, they risk being ineffective in the short-term and dangerous in 
the long-term as they instigate a vicious cycle in which health officials seek 
greater and greater authority to impose policies on an ever-more unwilling 
public. 
Whether the vaccine laws employed during the H1N1 outbreak 
enhanced the public’s trust in health officials or widened the circle of distrust 
is an empirical question whose answer remains unknown. Without doubt, 
H1N1 vaccine was produced and disseminated to large numbers of people 
relatively rapidly.229  Moreover, the vaccine appears to have been relatively 
safe.230  This “success” may have boosted the public’s confidence in the 
public health system. 
Nevertheless, there are reasons to worry that the extant pandemic 
vaccine legal regime, which effectively reduced the risk faced by vaccine 
makers while simultaneously diminishing the rights of individuals,231 might 
have broadened the gulf between public health officials and a wary 
public,232 a risk that might have been even greater if the H1N1 vaccine, like 
the 1976 swine flu vaccine, had been associated with a large number of 
significant adverse effects.  Rather than assuring individuals that their safety 
is the law’s first priority, and that they will be cared for if a vaccine causes 
them injury, the pandemic vaccine laws that were utilized during the 2009 
outbreak may have reaffirmed populist suspicions about the intentions of 
government, public health officials, and vaccine makers.  At the least, the 
laws fit comfortably within the populist, antigovernment narrative, thereby 
providing, however unintentionally, support for suspicions about the actions 
of health officials and the safety of vaccines. 
Consider first the least controversial set of pandemic laws, those 
providing for government’s purchase of pandemic vaccines.  Given that 
pandemic vaccines are partial public goods, government investment in them 
is probably necessary to assure an adequate supply.  Without government 
support, manufacturers would probably continue to under-invest in vaccines.  
But by agreeing to purchase vaccines before the need for them was certain, 
 
 229. See supra text accompanying note 4. 
 230. See supra text accompanying notes 6, 78-80. 
 231. The question of whether PREPA unconstitutionally limits the rights of individuals by 
limiting review of the Secretary’s actions, including, potentially, decisions as to individual 
claims, is beyond the scope of this paper.  Nevertheless, the act’s jurisdiction-stripping 
provisions clearly raise serious constitutional questions.  For a relatively recent discussion of 
the perplexing and oft-discussed question about Congress’ power to strip the courts of 
jurisdiction, see Douglas E. Edlin, A Constitutional Right to Judicial Review: Access to Courts 
and Ouster Clauses in England and the United States, 57 AM. J. COMP. L. 67, 70-71 (2009). 
 232. See RICHARD HOFSTADTER, THE PARANOID STYLE IN AMERICAN POLITICS AND OTHER 
ESSAYS 77-86 (1964). 
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the government effectively shifted the risk of over-production from 
manufacturers to the taxpayers.  Indeed by investing so heavily in vaccines 
and antiviral medications, the government ensured what leading anti-
vaccinationist Barbara Loe Fisher called a “pharmaceutical company 
stockholder dream scenario”233 and what leading public health law scholar 
Lawrence O. Gostin more dispassionately described as a “windfall for the 
pharmaceutical industry.”234 
This possible windfall inevitably provided fodder for vaccine critics who 
claimed that health authorities hyped the pandemic to support the interests 
of the pharmaceutical companies.  The belief that the pandemic was 
exaggerated to benefit vaccine makers was widespread in Europe, where the 
European Parliament and the Council of Europe, among other entities, have 
investigated the close ties between members of WHO’s advisory boards and 
pharmaceutical makers, questioning whether the interests of the latter 
influenced WHO’s decision to declare a pandemic.235  Of course, as 
Deborah Cohen and Phillip Carter noted in the British Medical Journal, 
“[p]lanning for the worst while hoping for the best remains a sensible 
approach.”236  If WHO and governments had not declared a pandemic and 
governments had failed to invest in vaccines, and the virus had proven more 
lethal, many more lives would have been lost. Nevertheless, by 
guaranteeing that vaccine makers would earn substantial sums even if the 
outbreak proved to be mild, the federal government, like the WHO, became 
vulnerable to the perception that it acted in the interests of pharmaceutical 
makers, rather than the public. 
Other supply side laws utilized by the federal government during the 
pandemic may have reinforced this perception.  As was noted above, the 
EUA procedure permits unlicensed medications and vaccines to be 
administered when the Secretary of DHHS declares a public health 
emergency.237  According to Quinn and colleagues, many members of the 
public had misgivings about receiving an unlicensed vaccine and the EUA 
procedure may diminish the public’s trust in health authorities.238  This 
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problem is especially grave among populations, including African 
Americans, who already have high levels of distrust of public health 
authorities.239  Although the research by Quinn and colleagues did not 
consider whether the EUA process may also provoke distrust among people 
who believe there are conflicts of interest between the government and 
pharmaceutical companies, it seems plausible that such individuals would 
be even more troubled than others about the EUA process.  In other words, 
individuals who believe that the risk from the pandemic was over-stated to 
profit vaccine makers may be especially apt to believe that the EUA process 
permits the use of dangerous, untested vaccines. 
PREPA provides even greater fuel for populist conspiracy theorists.  By 
shielding manufacturers from virtually any liability, on the basis of an 
unfettered and unreviewable declaration of a public health emergency, 240 
and by limiting review of HRSA’s compensation decisions,241 the Act creates 
the perfect target for anti-vaccinationists and others who believe that unsafe 
pandemic vaccines were foisted upon a vulnerable public. Thus during the 
H1N1 outbreak, the National Vaccine Information Center, one of the best 
known and most active anti-vaccinationist groups, posted articles on its 
website emphasizing PREPA’s broad liability provisions.242  For example, a 
September 2009 article by Barbara Loe Fisher stated: 
If you or your child are injured from getting a flu [sic] swine flu shot, you are 
on your own.  Because Congress shielded the vaccine manufacturers and 
any person giving swine flu shots from lawsuits if people get hurt.  There is 
no funded government vaccine injury compensation program for swine flu 
vaccine.243 
Although this statement was misleading because the HRSA-run 
compensation program was funded by September 2009, Fisher’s point was 
essentially correct: Congress had shielded vaccine makers from almost all 
liability.  Moreover, the quite limited compensation program established by 
PREPA was not yet up and running.244 
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Ironically, as the public’s trust in vaccine diminishes, public health 
officials seem even more anxious to compel vaccination.245  As discussed 
above, compulsory vaccination laws are likely to be of little merit during a 
pandemic in which the most pressing problem is a shortage of vaccine, 
rather than the public’s unwillingness to be vaccinated.246  Nevertheless, as 
the anti-vaccination movement has gained strength, public health scholars 
have increasingly focused their attention on compelling vaccination.247  Of 
course, correlation is not causation, but it seems plausible to think that the 
renewed interest in mandatory vaccination responds in part to officials’ 
concern that the public is growing increasingly wary of vaccines and is ever-
more-likely to reject them.248 
What is often overlooked when public health officials attempt to 
mandate vaccination is that compulsory immunization laws can themselves 
heighten the public’s distrust in vaccines, thereby exacerbating the very 
problem the laws are designed to counter.  This may especially be true when 
mandates are imposed rapidly, with relatively little public debate, regarding 
new vaccines, to which the public has not had time to become 
comfortable.249  For example, an executive order issued by Texas Governor 
Rick Perry in 2007 adding Gardasil, a recently-licensed human papilloma 
virus vaccine, to the state’s list of vaccines required for entering school, 
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created a furor among both social conservatives and libertarians.250  The 
controversy became even hotter when word came out that Gardisal’s 
manufacturer, Merck & Company had contributed to Perry’s political action 
committee.251  Responding to public outrage, the Texas legislature overrode 
Perry’s executive order.252 
Likewise, New York’s attempt to compel health care workers to be 
vaccinated against both seasonal and pandemic influenza ignited heated 
opposition.253  Without doubt, there are strong public health reasons to 
support the vaccination of health care workers.  As New York State Health 
Commissioner Richard Daines stated in an open letter to health care 
workers, “Medical literature convincingly demonstrates that high levels of 
staff immunity confer protection on those patients who cannot be or have 
not been effectively vaccinated, while also allowing the institution to remain 
more fully staffed.”254  However, while laws may be able to increase the 
vaccination rate of health care workers, Daines’ emergency regulation, 
which required workers to accept what they viewed as a new vaccine (for 
which they might not be able to receive compensation if they were 
injured)255 was almost destined to provoke a protest. The ensuring litigation 
by angry nurses and their unions was predictable.  Although commentators 
might have been accurate in arguing that the Constitution permits a state to 
penalize individuals who reject vaccination during a health emergency,256 
their assessment overlooked both the strength of the protesters’ non-
constitutional claims,257 and the social impact of unpopular mandates.  In 
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New York, protests by nurses contesting the emergency regulation as well as 
the litigation about the mandate, received significant media attention.258  
The impact of these stories, emphasizing health care workers’ resistance to 
vaccination, is uncertain, but surely they did not enhance the general 
public’s faith in the H1N1 vaccine.  Indeed, it is hard to think of an image 
more corrosive of the public’s trust in the vaccine than that of a nurse 
protesting a law requiring vaccination. 
Ironically, the battle over New York’s H1N1 vaccine regulation was for 
naught.  Commissioner Daines eventually concluded that there was little 
merit in continuing to litigate a regulation requiring health care workers to 
accept a vaccine that was in short supply.259  The emergency regulation was 
rescinded before the vaccine became readily available;260 but not before the 
damage to the vaccine’s image, and to the public’s trust in public health 
officials, may have been done. 
By failing to anticipate the potential social responses to his regulation, 
Commissioner Daines may have misplayed his hand.  Like many public 
health officials, he may have viewed public health law as a potent tool for 
promoting vaccination, a worthy goal from a public health perspective.  But 
what Daines and other public health officials and policymakers frequently 
fail to recognize is that law, without the public’s support, may be of limited 
utility.  Suspicion and mistrust, so widely evident today, can cast doubt upon 
public health laws that may seem both cost-effective and even beneficent to 
public health officials.  Suspicion and doubt can grow when vaccination 
laws put all of the risk on ordinary individuals and remove all of the risk 
from health officials and pharmaceutical makers.  Under these 
circumstances, it is not surprising that nurses took to the courts; nor is it 
surprising that millions of doses of vaccine had to be destroyed for lack of 
use.261 
 
 258. See, e.g., Anemona Hartocollis, Mandatory Flu Vaccination for N.Y. Health Workers is 
Criticized, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 13, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/10/14/health/policy/ 
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 259. See supra text accompanying notes 217-19. 
 260. See id. 
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CONCLUSION 
Many public health scholars and officials recognize the importance of 
trust in determining the efficacy of a public health campaign.262  Writing in 
the January 20, 2010 issue of the Journal of the American Medical 
Association, Heidi J. Larson and David L. Heymann observed that: 
Lack of trust can cause health programs to fail with harmful consequences. 
Measles out-breaks in the United Kingdom and the United States and the 
spread of polio across Africa from Northern Nigeria underscore the 
importance of building—and maintaining—public trust in health 
interventions and in the authorities who provide them. Trust relationships 
must be built over time so that they become the social framework in which 
health interventions—and positive health outcomes—can thrive.263 
The authors go on to explain that transparency is “an essential criteria of 
trust”264 and that: 
rather than becoming defensive in the face of an increasingly questioning 
public, the medical and public health communities must recognize the 
importance of changing the conversation with individual patients and the 
public and the importance of being open to hearing real concerns that will 
affect the acceptance or rejection of health services.265 
In making these important points, Larson and Heymann echo others in 
viewing the public’s lack of trust in public health policies as a result of poor 
health communication.266 But while transparency, listening, and honest 
communication –all elements that Larson and Heymann associate with good 
public health communication –are each important to the development and 
maintenance of trust, they may be insufficient if the underlying architecture 
of public health campaigns, created by public health laws, is distrustful of 
the public. 
By placing all of the risk of vaccine campaigns on ordinary individuals 
and none on either public health officials or pharmaceutical makers, the 
laws that governed the H1N1 vaccine campaign reflected a profound 
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disrespect for the people they were supposed to serve.  Indeed, when supply 
and demand side pandemic vaccine laws are viewed together, they appear 
to have presupposed that the public was both foolish and litigious.  Why 
else did these laws protect pharmaceutical companies and health officials 
from the anticipated poor decisions – either to abstain from the vaccine or 
to sue –of ordinary individuals? 
By assuming that the public is the problem, rather than the client, of 
public health services, pandemic vaccine laws risk exacerbating the growing 
distrust between public health officials and the public.  To put it another 
way, by giving the public a legitimate reason to fear that public health laws 
fail to allocate the risks associated with pandemic vaccines in an equitable 
manner, pandemic vaccine laws risk reinforcing the suspicions and distrust 
to which they respond.  At the very least, these laws provide public health 
critics with grist to grind in their mill. 
If this hypothesis is correct, (and without a doubt more empirical support 
is required to affirm it), the “solution” cannot rely simply on better 
communication skills.  Honest and transparent communication cannot “sell” 
a product that disserves the public’s interest.  In the case of the H1N1 
vaccine, a candid and transparent disclosure of the risk allocation scheme 
established by the pandemic vaccine laws would have required explaining to 
individuals that although there was no reason to believe that the risks of the 
vaccine were greater than those associated with the typical seasonal flu 
vaccine, individuals who did experience an adverse outcome would have 
been entitled to very limited, or no compensation at all, via a system that 
was not fully established, and which was not likely subject to any external 
review or oversight.  They also would have been told that vaccine makers 
that profited from the vaccine were absolved of almost all liability, even if 
the vaccine was produced negligently.  They would have been told that the 
laws of many states permitted health officials (if a public health emergency 
was declared) to detain them if they refused this vaccine.  This transparent 
and candid disclosure seems unlikely to entice many people to seek 
vaccination, unless the pandemic itself were sufficiently frightening, in which 
case, of course, there may have been little need to worry about insufficient 
demand for the vaccine. 
What, then, is the solution to the dilemma of pandemic vaccines?  
Unfortunately, there are no simple answers.  Public health policymakers face 
real and complex problems in trying to ensure a rapid and adequate supply 
of vaccines in the face of uncertain risks.  These problems may make the 
reallocation of some economic risk to the taxpayers sensible. Still, it is 
critical that policymakers appreciate what law can and cannot do. 
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Public health law is an essential and powerful tool for protecting the 
public health, albeit one subject to constitutional and other legal 
limitations.267  In the case of pandemic vaccines, public health law has been 
used, successfully and not so successfully, to expedite the production, 
licensing, and distribution of vaccines.  Public health law may also provide 
officials with significant authority to determine the allocation of vaccine, or 
even, to impose penalties on individuals who refuse vaccines. 
But legal authority cannot protect public health without the acceptance, 
and perhaps active support, of affected populations.  To garner that 
acceptance, support, and indeed trust, public health laws must do more 
than provide officials with authority or corporations with financial incentives.  
They must also provide a firm basis for public trust, so that when public 
health officials communicate with candor and transparency the story they tell 
is one that does not incite suspicion. 
To ensure that the story does not erode trust, public health policymakers 
may need to reconsider how pandemic vaccine laws allocate risk, both 
financial and legal.  Almost certainly government investment in vaccine 
research and production, and the potential conflicts of interest that may 
engender,268 are unavoidable.  But PREPA’s liability provisions seem far 
more protective of industry, and far less protective of the public, than is 
necessary or useful.  Vaccine manufacturers receive significant liability 
protections under NCVIA; but that Act is far more generous to individuals 
who believe they have been harmed than is PREPA.  Perhaps most 
importantly, NCVIA provides some basis for accountability and oversight, 
since claimants maintain the right to an independent decision-maker to hear 
their claims. That most fundamental right, often associated with due 
process,269 as well as our system of checks and balances, is insufficiently 
recognized by PREPA. 
In addition, there is little justification for giving individuals who are 
injured by pandemic vaccine less compensation than they would receive if 
they were injured by another vaccine. Indeed, since it is more important, 
from a public health perspective, for an individual to accept a pandemic 
vaccine, than many other vaccines covered by NCVIA,270 the compensation 
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for injuries due to pandemic vaccines should be at least as great as those 
under NCVIA.  This should especially be the case for any vaccines that are 
distributed pursuant to the EUA process.  Individuals who willingly take an 
unlicensed vaccine should not forfeit their right to compensation for any 
injuries they may suffer.  Rather, just like vaccine makers, individuals should 
have their risks protected. 
Public health officials may also want to reconsider their fondness for 
vaccine mandates, at least during pandemics. As the H1N1 pandemic 
illustrated, mandates are relatively useless in the early weeks and months of 
a pandemic when vaccine is in short supply.  But talk of mandates can 
create needless anxiety and garner negative publicity, as anti-
vaccinationists, civil libertarians, and individuals who fear they will be 
subject to the mandate organize in opposition. 
Most importantly, public health lawyers and policymakers should rethink 
their conception of public health legal preparedness.  In order to prepare 
for a pandemic, or any other public health emergency, public health 
officials must know the laws under which they operate.  But legal “powers” 
and extraordinary “authorities” alone cannot assure the public’s health.  
Trust and the willingness to comply with the advice of public health officials 
are also essential.  For that, public health lawyers need to think both more 
broadly and more subtlety.  They need to consider how law can be used to 
build a robust and resilient community that can withstand the ravages of a 
public health emergency.271  Additionally, they need to consider how to use 
law with a gentle hand that respects the rights and interests of not only the 
powerful, but also the public that public health laws are meant to serve. 
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